Contrasting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice by Arlen, Jennifer
ARLEN_FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2010 10:58 AM 
 
(957) 
University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 
FOUNDED 1852 
________________ 
Formerly 
American Law Register 
________________________ 
VOL. 158 MARCH 2010 NO. 4 
ARTICLE 
CONTRACTING OVER LIABILITY:  MEDICAL  
MALPRACTICE AND THE COST OF CHOICE  
JENNIFER ARLEN† 
Contractual liability proponents claim that states can best reform malprac-
tice liability by allowing patients to contract over and out of liability.  Propo-
 
 † Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  I would 
like to thank the following people for their helpful comments:  Kenneth Abraham, 
Thomas Baker, Kevin Davis, Einer Elhauge, Richard Epstein, Mark Geistfeld, Clark 
Havighurst, Robert Lee Hotz, Keith Hylton, Richard Hynes, Marcel Kahan, Ehud Ka-
mar, Lewis Kornhauser, Reinier Kraakman, Shmuel Leshem, Bentley MacLeod, Kristin 
Madison, Michelle Mello, Geoffrey Miller, Paul Rubin, William Sage, Catherine Shar-
key, Steven Shavell, Matthew Spitzer, George Triantis, Rip Verkerke, Katrina Wyman, 
Kathryn Zeiler, and participants at the annual meeting of the American Law and Eco-
nomics Association and workshops at Duke University School of Law, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, Harvard Law School, University of Michigan Law School, University 
of Southern California School of Law, Temple University Law School, and University 
of Virginia School of Law.  I want to give special thanks to Sherry Glied for numerous 
helpful discussions.  I also wish to thank my research assistants Joshua Levy and Xin Yu, 
as well as Rachel Jones and Jerome Miller.  I am grateful for the financial support of 
the D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund of the New York University School of Law. 
ARLEN_FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2010  10:58 AM 
958 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 957 
nents assert that informed patients would be better off if they were allowed to 
contract over liability than they would be if states reformed malpractice liability 
directly because informed patients would contract for the rules that maximize 
their welfare.  Proponents also claim that states reforming malpractice liability 
could only benefit patients by including a right to contract out of liability.  This 
Article demonstrates that these claims are incorrect.  Informed patients who 
value state-imposed malpractice liability can be hurt by the introduction of con-
tractual liability, because contractual liability produces lower deterrence benefits 
at a higher price.  Four inefficiencies make contractual liability a less beneficial 
and more costly form of liability than state-imposed malpractice liability:  collec-
tive goods problems, time inconsistency, adverse selection, and network external-
ity problems.  Adoption of contractual liability therefore would hurt patients 
who value liability because it would force them to use a less valuable and more 
expensive form of liability and create inefficient incentives for patients to waive 
liability that would have been optimal if imposed by the state.  This conclusion 
holds whether patients negotiate liability contracts directly with individual phy-
sicians or are presented with standard form contracts governing malpractice 
liability offered by their health insurers. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Each year, more than a hundred and fifty thousand people are 
killed and more than a million people are injured by medical error, 
much of which is preventable.1  Indeed, more people are killed each 
year by medical negligence than are killed by either automobile acci-
dents or workplace injuries.2 
Malpractice liability is potentially one of the most effective me-
chanisms for reducing medical error.  Well-designed malpractice lia-
bility can optimally deter error by giving medical providers direct fi-
nancial incentives to make cost-effective investments in patient safety.  
This benefits patients and medical providers alike.3   
 
1  See Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice (discussing evidence that 
patients suffer more than 150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, more than half of 
which were caused by medical negligence), in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 
1339, 1351 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000); see also infra Section 
I.A (discussing the rate of medical error and its causes).  
2 Id. at 1351-52. 
3  See Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Torts, Expertise, and Authority:  Liability 
of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 494, 507-11 (2005) (ar-
guing that malpractice liability can be used to induce medical providers to invest opti-
mally to reduce medical error); infra note 45 (discussing empirical evidence).  
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In its current form, however, medical malpractice liability is not as 
effective as it could be.  It must be reformed.  This raises two ques-
tions:  (1) what is the best process for reforming the system, and (2) 
what provisions should be included in any state-adopted reforms? 
At present, a heated battle rages between proponents of two oppos-
ing answers to these questions.  One group seeks to reform malpractice 
liability from within.4  The other wants to replace malpractice liability 
with liability imposed by contracts executed between patients and med-
ical providers, either individual medical providers5 or health insurers.6 
 
4  See infra note 19.  
5  See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE ch. 14 (2008) (assert-
ing that patients should be permitted to contract over liability); Richard A. Epstein, 
Contractual Principle Versus Legislative Fixes:  Coming to Closure on the Unending Travails of 
Medical Malpractice, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 505 (2005) [hereinafter Epstein, Contrac-
tual Principle] (asserting that it is a fundamental error to treat malpractice reform as a 
tort problem because “designing a governance regime calls for a contractual re-
sponse”); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contrac-
tual Foundation for Medical Services, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 202 (1986) (ar-
guing in favor of contractual malpractice liability); Richard A. Epstein, Medical 
Malpractice:  The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 94-95, 149 (1976) (con-
tending that contractual physician liability is the superior approach to medical liabili-
ty); Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma:  Market Opportunities and Legal 
Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 161-62 (1986) (claiming that a larger role 
for private agreements in the determination of physician liability would benefit all par-
ties involved); Glen O. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks 
Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 198 (1986) (explaining 
why medical malpractice liability should be governed by contract); see also Keith N. 
Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:  An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 209, 263 (2000) (insisting that parties to consensual relationships should 
be allowed to contract over liability).    
6  See, e.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 265-302 (1995) (advo-
cating contractual MCO liability for physician negligence); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort 
Liability:  A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 493-94 (1997) (support-
ing limited contractual liability for MCOs); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability:  Re-
locating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2000) [he-
reinafter Havighurst, Vicarious Liability] (asserting that MCOs should be liable for all 
medical malpractice committed by healthcare providers but should be allowed to alter 
or eliminate this liability by contract); William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerg-
ing Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 208 (1997) (arguing 
that Congress should impose contractual liability for medical negligence on MCOs); see 
also PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT 75-77 (1993) (advocating patient con-
tracting over malpractice damage awards through health insurers); THALER & SUN-
TEIN, supra note 5, at 212-13 (suggesting that insurers should be allowed to contract 
with patients over physician liability for negligence); Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. 
Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care:  Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Ac-
tions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 644-48 (2001) (arguing that states should allow MCOs to 
limit liability by contract).   
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Proponents of contractual liability assert that all patients would 
benefit if states allowed patients to contract over liability because some 
patients would benefit from the right to contract and none would be 
hurt, as long as contracting is voluntary and patients know the ex-
pected benefits and costs of liability.  Proponents’ claim that informed 
patients7 cannot be hurt by contracting over malpractice liability rests 
on the assumption that patients obtain the full benefit of state-
imposed liability, and bear the same cost, when they impose liability 
by contract.  Thus, any informed patient who would have derived a 
net benefit from state-imposed liability would impose the same liabili-
ty rule by contract and obtain the same net benefit.  Only those pa-
tients who would not have been well served by state-imposed liability 
would use their right to contract to alter or eliminate liability.  Contract-
ing would allow these patients to select a liability rule that they prefer.8 
The claim that informed patients would be unambiguously better 
off if allowed to contract over liability has won the day with many scho-
lars.  Indeed, even most opponents of contractual liability accept the 
proposition that informed rational patients cannot be hurt by the 
right to contract over liability;9 they focus their objections on informa-
tion or behavioral problems10 that proponents claim do not, or need 
not, exist.11  Embracing proponents’ view, a growing number of scho-
 
7 Throughout this Article, the term “informed patients” is used to refer to patients 
who are informed about the costs and benefits of imposing liability by contract.  They 
are not informed about each individual medical provider’s risk of medical error, how-
ever.  This Article assumes that patients are informed about the costs and benefits of 
malpractice liability in order to evaluate proponents’ claim that contractual liability en-
hances patients’ welfare when patients make rational, informed, contract choices.  This 
Article shows that even in this favorable situation, contractual liability is not efficient.  
8  For a summary of the conventional economic case for contract, see PAUL C. 
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 96 (1991).  For an exposition of the claim 
that contracting over liability would allow patients to adopt rules that achieve the bal-
ance between cost and quality for which they are willing to pay, see Epstein, Contractual 
Principle, supra note 5, at 507-09. 
9  See infra Section II.B.  
10 See, e.g., Tom Baker & Timothy Lytton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue 
for Medical Malpractice:  A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2010) (manuscript at 5-12) (observing that behavioral biases may undermine pa-
tients’ ability to contract effectively on their own behalf). 
11 See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 6, at 647-48 (claiming that MCO contractual 
liability would not be plagued by serious information problems); see also J. Mark Ram-
seyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering:  Notes on a Japanese Experiment, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1823, 1825 (1996) (arguing that the claim that consumers are not suffi-
ciently informed to contract over products liability is empirically “questionable”); Alan 
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform:  A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 
378-84 (1988). 
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lars—including some in the current administration—promote the 
idea that patients should be allowed to contract over liability.12  The 
most ardent proponents want states to delegate the entire task of re-
forming malpractice liability to contract by allowing patients and their 
individual medical providers to contract for the reforms they prefer.13  
More moderate proponents want contracting to be a component of 
state-adopted malpractice liability reform, contending that states 
should reform malpractice by imposing liability for all actionable er-
rors on Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)14 and then permit 
MCOs to contract with patients to alter or eliminate liability.15 
Notwithstanding scholars’ widespread acceptance of the core eco-
nomic argument for contractual liability, proponents have never 
demonstrated the validity of their foundational claim that informed 
patients necessarily benefit from the right to contract over malpractice 
liability.  Specifically, they have never shown that (1) informed pa-
tients will contract for optimal liability reforms or that (2) no in-
formed patient would be worse off under contractual liability because 
informed patients can get as much benefit from contractual liability as 
they can from liability imposed by the state by fiat. 
This Article employs economic analysis to assess the validity of 
proponents’ claims that patients necessarily benefit from the right to 
contract over malpractice liability and its reform, provided they know 
the costs and benefits of imposing liability.  It shows that these claims 
are incorrect.  Informed patients16 would not necessarily use the right 
to contract to adopt optimal liability reforms.  Moreover, a state 
adopting effective liability reforms would hurt citizens who benefit 
from state-imposed liability if it allowed them to contract out of it. 
As proponents recognize, informed patients necessarily benefit 
from the right to contract only if patients have optimal incentives to 
contract over liability.  This implies that patients must obtain the same 
benefit, at the same cost, when they impose liability by contract as they 
 
12 Recent scholars to embrace contractual malpractice liability include Cass Suns-
tein.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 212-13.  Courts also now enforce clauses 
requiring mandatory arbitration of medical claims; these clauses affect expected liabili-
ty.  See Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 24 
A.L.R.5TH 1, 47-52 (1994). 
13 See, e.g., Epstein, Contractual Principle, supra note 5, at 509.  
14 This Article defines an MCO as any insurer that attempts to influence the quali-
ty of care selected either directly, through utilization review, or indirectly, through fi-
nancial incentives provided to physicians to cut costs (e.g., capitation). 
15 See sources cited supra note 6. 
16 See supra note 7.  
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could get from liability imposed by a welfare-maximizing state by fiat.17  
Contractual liability proponents have always assumed that this re-
quirement is met.  This Article shows that it is not.  Informed patients 
get less benefit, at a higher cost, from contractual liability than from 
state-imposed liability as a result of a host of inefficiencies plaguing 
malpractice liability contracts.  These inefficiencies, which include col-
lective goods problems, time-inconsistency problems, adverse selec-
tion, and network externalities, lower the benefit and increase the cost 
to patients of contractual liability relative to state-imposed liability. 
Contractual liability proponents assume that each patient obtains 
the same net benefit from a liability rule whether it is imposed by fiat 
or by contract because they assume that contracting simply increases 
the choices available to patients without altering value of liability to 
patients.  This assumption is incorrect.  Contractual liability is a mate-
rially different form of liability than state-imposed liability, with differ-
ent benefits and costs.  Traditional malpractice liability is imposed col-
lectively and automatically by all patients on all providers throughout 
time.  By contrast, contractual liability is imposed by individual pa-
tients on a specific set of providers at the moment of contracting, and 
only by request.  These structural differences affect the benefit to pa-
tients of imposing liability because both investments in medical care 
and malpractice liability are collective goods; they also affect current 
and future patients.  By contrast, contractual liability is not imposed 
collectively—it only reaches a subset of current providers, and only as 
of the moment of contract.  Moreover, all else being equal, the cost to 
patients of liability is lower when it is imposed automatically by the 
state than when patients must contract into it because medical provid-
ers contracting for liability would charge an inefficiently high price for 
it as a result of adverse selection.18  Thus, patients can more effectively 
use liability to regulate quality investments that are collective goods, 
made across multiple time periods, by current and future providers, 
when the state imposes collective liability on all providers, than when 
they must contract for liability. 
 
17 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 183-84 (positing that the case for contract de-
pends on whether “in general, private parties are likely to achieve results that are at 
least as good and fair for themselves as would be achieved by paternalistic interven-
tion”); see also HAVIGHURST, supra note 6, at 266 (arguing that there seems “to be a 
strong inducement for consumers and providers jointly to discover and to agree on rules 
and procedures that reduce the uncertainty, complexity, and volume of litigation”). 
18 For a discussion of adverse selection, see infra Section III.C and Part IV. 
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To establish that patients do not have optimal incentives to con-
tract over malpractice liability, this Article considers two leading pro-
posed forms of contracting over liability.  It first considers proposals to 
permit patients to negotiate liability contracts with individual medical 
providers when patients seek medical services, evaluating both the 
claim that patients would contract into optimal reforms and the claim 
that patients would benefit if allowed to contract around state-adopted 
reforms.  This Article then considers proposals to allow a form of col-
lective contracting over liability, under which MCOs would bear any 
malpractice liability imposed and would present health insurance sub-
scribers with health insurance contracts governing their right to sue 
for medical malpractice. 
This Article first demonstrates that states cannot rely on individual 
contracting over liability to achieve optimal malpractice liability 
reform because patients will not contract individually to adopt optimal 
reforms.  This is because many optimal reforms are valuable only if 
adopted by most patients simultaneously.  The value of reforms, such 
as hospital liability and MCO liability, depends on their collective 
adoption because they are designed to use the collective threat of lia-
bility to induce medical entities to make substantial investments and 
fundamental structural reforms that reduce the risk to all of their pa-
tients of being injured by medical error.  For example, hospitals held 
liable for all medical errors on site would substantially improve their 
provider monitoring, supervision, health care technology, and admin-
istrative systems—to the benefit of all hospital patients.19  State-
imposed medical-entity liability would produce these deterrence bene-
fits, with each patient benefiting from the collective safety investments 
produced by the threat of liability to other patients.  By contrast, pa-
tients would not reap equivalent benefits from contracting individual-
ly to impose liability on a hospital.  This is because hospitals will not 
invest as much in error-reducing structural reforms and health care 
 
19 There have been many proposals for medical-entity liability.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. 
Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American 
Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 398-414 (1994) (proposing hospital enter-
prise liability for medical error); Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice 
Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1961-79 
(2003) (favoring MCO liability for both their own negligence in making treatment de-
cisions and physician negligence); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence 
of Medical Errors:  Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1623-
26 (2002) (arguing in favor of hospital enterprise liability created by requiring hospit-
als to pay for and provide malpractice liability insurance to their affiliated physicians); 
and Sage, supra note 6, at 164-69, 206-09 (discussing the benefits of MCO liability for 
medical malpractice).  
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technology in response to the threat of liability to one patient as they 
would if subject to potential liability to all of their patients.  Moreover, 
individual contracting over reforms such as hospital liability would be 
plagued by a free-rider problem because hospitals tend to standardize 
systemic safety practices, such as administrative systems and protocols, 
across all patients.  Thus, each informed patient contracting over lia-
bility would have an incentive to reduce her costs by eschewing hos-
pital liability, safe in the knowledge that if other patients imposed it 
she would benefit from the resulting systemic safety improvements 
even if she does not contract for medical-entity liability.  Accordingly, 
contracting is not an optimal mechanism for reforming malpractice 
liability because even when every patient would value hospital liability 
if it were collectively imposed, each patient contracting over liability 
nevertheless might rationally elect not to reform liability through in-
dividual contracts.  Thus, states cannot rely on contracting over liabili-
ty to reform malpractice liability. 
This Article next considers the separate claim that states that 
adopt optimal malpractice liability reforms could only benefit their 
informed citizens by allowing patients to negotiate liability contracts 
with their individual providers.  This Article shows that this claim also 
is incorrect.  Patients who benefit from state-imposed liability are 
worse off when allowed to contract individually over liability, even 
when they are informed, because individual negotiable contracting 
reduces the value and increases the cost to patients of any liability im-
posed.  As a result, patients get less benefit from any liability they im-
pose.  Moreover, contracting would create inefficient incentives for 
patients to waive liability. 
Patients get less benefit from the right to impose liability through 
individual negotiated contracts than from liability imposed by the 
state.  This is because a primary goal of liability is to induce medical 
providers to invest in their capacity to select and provide proper care, 
which hereinafter is referred to as expertise.  These investments in 
expertise produce collective benefits, reducing the risk of error for 
most, if not all, of a provider’s patients; moreover, they often are cost-
justified only in light of this collective benefit.  The state can induce 
providers to make cost-effective investments in expertise by imposing 
optimal liability by fiat.20  This liability benefits each patient by reduc-
ing her risk of medical error.  Patients do not achieve an equivalent 
reduction in their risk of error when they impose liability individually, 
 
20 See Arlen and MacLeod, supra note 19, at 1982-83. 
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however, because a provider will not make the same investment in ex-
pertise and other types of collective care in response to the threat of 
liability to one patient as when faced with liability to all patients.  In-
deed, an individual patient may not be able to produce a sufficient 
threat of liability to induce any material investments in collective care.  
Moreover, each patient can waive liability without losing the benefit of 
any collective safety investments induced by the threat of liability to 
other patients.  As a result, under contractual liability, patients who 
would have benefited from state-imposed liability would face strong 
incentives to waive liability, to their detriment.21 
Patients required to obtain liability through individual negotiable 
contracts would lose another benefit of state-imposed liability.  State-
imposed liability can be used to give medical providers incentives to 
make durable investments in care for the benefit of future patients.  
By contrast, patients required to impose liability through negotiable 
individual contracts would be unable to use the threat of future liabili-
ty to induce providers to make precontractual investments in care.  
This lost benefit would increase the likelihood that contracting would 
lead patients to sign inefficient liability waivers.22 
Finally, individual contracting over liability could harm patients by 
increasing the cost to them of imposing liability.  Instead of setting the 
price for liability at the expected cost of bearing liability to this patient 
or to the average patient, providers would price liability at the cost of 
bearing liability to the type of patients they expect to select liability 
contracts.  The group of patients who prefer liability can be expected 
to include a disproportionate percentage of the patients who impose 
higher-than-average liability costs, however, since these patients derive 
 
21 See id. at 2003-04. 
22 Infra Section III.B; see also Jennifer Arlen, Private Contractual Alternatives to Mal-
practice Liability, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 245, 257 
(William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006).  Renegotiation also undermines patients’ 
ability to use contractual liability to regulate the moral hazard problem.  See Arlen & 
MacLeod, supra note 19, at 2002 (explaining that patients and providers cannot use 
renegotiable contractual liability to induce physicians to make efficient nonverifiable 
investments in postcontractual care because providers know that patients will waive lia-
bility after providers decide how much to invest); Abraham Wickelgren, The Inefficiency 
of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168, 173-75 
(2006) (showing that contracting over products liability is inefficient if consumers are 
able to waive liability after the producer has invested in quality, because consumers’ 
incentives to waive once investments are fixed will result in producers underinvesting 
in product quality in anticipation of liability being waived); see also Drew Fudenberg & 
Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1279, 
1280 (1990) (finding that the ability to renegotiate a contract undermines the princip-
al’s ability to use incentive contracts to induce agents to invest in effort postcontract). 
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a disproportionate benefit from the right to impose liability.  Accor-
dingly, providers would charge each patient more for the right to im-
pose liability by contract than they would charge for state-imposed lia-
bility because they expect that patients who seek out the right to 
impose liability will be more likely to use it.23  This surcharge is not ef-
ficient, however, because it also would fall on low-liability-risk patients 
who value safety, creating an inefficient incentive for them to reject 
contractual liability. 
The conclusion that individual negotiating over contracting is in-
efficient raises the question of whether contractual liability can be 
structured to remedy these problems by making contracting more col-
lective and nonnegotiable.  This Article therefore considers the do-
minant alternative contractual liability proposal under which MCOs 
would bear all default liability for medical malpractice but could con-
tract over liability with patients by including nonnegotiable standard 
form clauses governing liability in their health insurance plans.24  This 
Article shows that MCO contractual liability would enable patients to 
capture more of the benefits of state-imposed liability.  MCO contrac-
tual liability nevertheless is inefficient because it would materially in-
crease the costs to patients of imposing liability by severely exacerbat-
ing the adverse selection problem. 
Contracting between patients and insurers over liability would ex-
acerbate the adverse selection problem because patients who need se-
rious or regular medical care are most likely to value liability, as they 
face the greatest risk of medical error.  Consequently, in order to break 
even on liability contracts, MCOs would have to price the liability insur-
ance plans to reflect both the cost of liability and the higher expected 
health care costs of the patients likely to purchase these liability-
inclusive insurance plans.  This surcharge would harm healthy patients 
who value liability by forcing them to pay more for liability than is op-
timal—and more than they would have to pay if the state imposed liabil-
ity by fiat.  This surcharge would force many who would have benefited 
from state-imposed liability to waive liability altogether.  As a result, 
many patients would obtain lower-quality care than is optimal. 
Finally, this Article considers the claim that patients should be al-
lowed to vary the standard of care, even if they cannot contract out of 
liability, because all patients benefit when each is allowed to contract 
 
23 See infra Section III.C (discussing adverse selection).  
24 This Article does not separately consider standard form contracting between 
patients and physicians because this type of contracting would face all the problems 
identified in Part IV, as well as additional problems.  See infra note 123. 
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for the level of care that reflects her individual willingness to pay for 
safety.  This Article reveals that this claim is incorrect because medical 
care is characterized by network externalities.  Health care delivery is 
more cost-effective when providers are subject to a relatively common 
standard of care because standardization facilitates the training and 
monitoring of physicians, research into best medical practices, and 
coordination of care across providers.  Thus, patients as a whole could 
be hurt by their individual efforts to alter the standard of care because 
each patient’s effort to obtain the standard of care she prefers could 
produce more variation in standards than is good for the system, and 
thus for patients. 
Accordingly, this Article demonstrates that contracting over liabil-
ity, even under the best of circumstances, is neither an effective me-
chanism for reforming malpractice liability nor a necessarily beneficial 
component of malpractice liability reform.  Instead, informed patients 
who benefit from liability generally are better off when the state im-
poses their preferred rule than when they are required to obtain it by 
contract.  Moreover, this Article reveals that, contrary to proponents’ 
claims, contractual liability does not enhance patients’ choices.  In-
stead, it would harm patients who value state-imposed liability by forc-
ing them to use a form of liability that provides them lower benefits at 
greater cost.  This suggests that states genuinely interested in their cit-
izens’ welfare would likely better serve their citizens by adopting effec-
tive malpractice liability reform within the tort system rather than by 
embracing contracting over liability. 
Part I of this Article discusses the standard economic justification 
for malpractice liability and presents the traditional claim that pa-
tients always benefit when they are allowed either to reform liability by 
contract or to contract out of any reforms adopted by the state.  Part II 
shows that patients negotiating over liability with individual providers 
would not contract into optimal malpractice liability reforms.  Part III 
demonstrates that states adopting effective reforms would harm pa-
tients who benefit from liability if they allowed patients to negotiate 
over liability with their individual providers.  Part IV examines the 
nonnegotiable collective contracting between patients and MCOs and 
shows that this form of contractual liability would harm patients be-
cause it is plagued by adverse selection.  Part V reveals that contract-
ing over the standard of care would produce more variation than is 
optimal as a result of contracting patients’ failure to take adequate ac-
count of network externalities.  Part VI concludes by discussing the 
implications of this analysis for malpractice liability reform. 
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I.  THE CLASSIC ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR CONTRACTUAL 
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 
Patients receiving medical care face a serious risk of being severely 
injured or killed by medical error.25  Medical error causes enormous 
human suffering and significantly increases health care costs.  Pre-
ventable medical error is estimated to cost about $17 to $29 billion 
per year.26  Injuries to hospital patients resulting from medical negli-
gence impose average additional costs of approximately $1246 per pa-
tient admission.27 
Medical error is not only devastating and expensive, but also large-
ly avoidable.  Physicians and hospitals could dramatically curtail medi-
cal error by making additional cost-effective investments in patient 
safety—including greater physician investment in expertise, as well as 
greater hospital investment in improved administrative systems and 
oversight of residents and interns.28  Yet, hospitals and physicians will 
not invest adequately in patient safety of their own accord.  States 
must intervene to induce them to make these investments. 
States can use the threat of liability for medical negligence to in-
duce medical providers to reduce the risk of medical error.  Yet to do so 
effectively, states must reform existing malpractice liability laws.  This 
raises the questions of what process states should use to reform mal-
practice liability and what provisions these reforms should include. 
Proponents of contractual liability assert that contract holds the 
answer to both questions.  They claim that states can rely on patients 
to adopt optimal reforms by contract.  They also claim that states that 
 
25 See Danzon, supra note 1, at 1351. 
26 See INST. OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN:  BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 27 
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN].   
27 Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors?  An Analysis of Adverse Event 
Costs, the Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 835, 847 (2007); see also Chunliu Zhan & Marlene R. Miller, Excess 
Length of Stay, Charges, and Mortality Attributable to Medical Injuries During Hospitalization, 
290 JAMA 1868, 1872 (2003) (finding that hospital errors result in excess national 
health care costs of almost $5 billion per year). 
28 See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:  MEDICAL IN-
JURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 42-44, 137-39 (1993) 
(identifying both inadequate physician expertise and institutional problems in hospit-
als as leading causes of medical error); Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ:  
Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 363 (2005) (finding 
that many medical errors are attributable to individuals, as well as to factors under the 
control of hospitals); Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence:  
The Role of Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 620 
(2008) (same); infra Section I.A.  
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reform malpractice directly should include a provision allowing pa-
tients to contract around or out of liability, thereby transforming mal-
practice liability into a set of default rules. 
This Part discusses the causes of medical error and explains how 
malpractice liability benefits patients by inducing providers to make 
cost-effective investments in care.  It then presents the standard eco-
nomic argument for contractual liability, which is based on economic 
analyses of contracting over products liability.  Finally, this Part identi-
fies reasons to question the validity of this economic case for contract 
as applied to contractual malpractice liability. 
A.  Causes of Medical Error and the Goals of Malpractice Liability 
Malpractice liability benefits both patients and providers when 
used to induce doctors and hospitals to invest in cost-effective meas-
ures designed to reduce the risk of error.  By giving medical providers 
incentives to invest optimally in patient safety, well-designed malprac-
tice liability enables providers to promise to deliver, and thus to 
charge for, the quality of care that patients want to receive.29 
Malpractice liability is needed because patients face a substantial 
unobservable and preventable risk of being injured by medical error.  
This risk is not limited to patients who seek treatment from incompe-
tent physicians.  In fact, most medical errors—including those that re-
sult in serious injury and death—are caused by otherwise competent 
medical providers who err accidentally.30  These errors, while acciden-
tal, are not inevitable.  Studies have found that patients often are in-
jured because their physicians did not know the proper diagnosis or 
treatment or were not technically competent to perform the proce-
dure safely.31  Physicians could substantially reduce patients’ risk of be-
 
29 See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 3. 
30 At one point, people assumed that most medical errors were caused by a few 
bad doctors.  Empirical analyses consistently refute this “bad apple” view of medical 
error.  See, e.g., John E. Rolph et al., Identifying Malpractice-Prone Physicians, 4 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 150 (2007).  Accordingly, even if the medical community were 
able to police its members adequately, this regulation would not eliminate the primary 
causes of medical error.  
31 See Andrews, supra note 28, at 390 fig.3 (showing that almost 38% of medical 
errors in a Chicago hospital were at least partially attributable to individual error re-
sulting from poor technical performance, poor judgment, or the failure to obtain or 
act on information, and that a substantial percentage of these errors were also caused 
by inadequate training or supervision); Mello & Studdert, supra note 28, at 606 tbl.1 
(finding 48% of medical errors producing a claim were attributable, at least in part, to 
the physician’s lack of technical competence or knowledge and that 57% were attri-
butable to a failure of vigilance or memory); see also ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS 
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ing injured by medical error by investing more in their capacity to 
provide quality care—for example, by investing more in the expertise 
and health care technology needed to properly diagnose patients, se-
lect treatments, and perform procedures without error.32 
Hospitals also could better protect patients.  Studies have found 
that between four and eighteen percent of hospital patients are the 
victims of medical errors, many of which cause serious injuries.33  
Nearly sixty percent of these errors are attributable to systemic prob-
lems under the hospital’s control,34 including inadequate supervision 
of medical personnel.35  These systemic problems include inadequate 
procedures for transferring responsibility for patients, inadequate 
staffing, inadequate provider oversight, and inadequate health care 
 
197-98 (2002) (describing the findings of three studies where autopsies of patients who 
died in the hospital revealed that 40% were misdiagnosed and that one-third of these 
patients would have been expected to live if properly diagnosed and treated); JEROME 
GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 24 (2007) (noting evidence suggesting that 10-15% 
of physicians’ diagnoses are wrong); Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health 
Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003) 
(showing that patients on average receive only about 55% of recommended care); 
Mark A. Schuster et al., How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United States?, 76 
MILBANK Q. 517, 521 (1998) (finding that, for chronic conditions, only “60 percent [of 
patients] received recommended care and 20 percent received contraindicated care”).  
32 See TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 26, at 4; WEILER ET AL., supra note 28, at 9-10; 
Andrews, supra note 28, at 387; Mello & Studdert, supra note 28, at 617.   
33 The lowest estimate of hospital error is based on the Harvard Medical Malprac-
tice Study, which examined written hospital records for medical error and used a con-
servative standard for detecting error.  See WEILER ET AL., supra note 28, at 43 (finding 
that 3.7% of the hospitalized patients studied were injured by the medical treatment 
they received); infra note 75 (discussing this study).  A subsequent study employing on-
site observation of hospital error found that almost 18% of hospital patients were the 
victims of at least one error sufficiently serious to prolong their hospital stay.  Many of 
these errors were not recorded in the hospital’s written records.  See Andrews, supra 
note 28, at 362; see also Robert H. Brook et al., Effectiveness of Nonemergency Care Via an 
Emergency Room, 78 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 333, 337 (1973) (finding that only 25% of 
patients seeking care in an emergency room received at least “minimally adequate 
medical care”); Knight Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness on a General Medical Service at a Uni-
versity Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 638, 639 (1981) (finding that 9% of 815 patients 
were harmed by medical error that was either life threatening or produced disability). 
34 See Mello & Studdert, supra note 28, at 605 (showing that 56% of errors where 
claims were filed had systemic causes, usually in addition to individual causes); see also 
Andrews, supra note 28, at 362-63 (finding that hospital practices, including adminis-
trative systems, are important contributing causes of medical error). 
35 See Mello & Studdert, supra note 28, at 606 tbl.1 (finding that inadequate super-
vision was a contributing cause of 20% of the medical errors that resulted in claims).  
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technology.36  Hospitals also affect physicians’ error rates through 
their rules governing the work hours of their interns and residents.37 
Hospitals could significantly improve patients’ health by reducing 
medical error.  Evidence suggests that improving hospital safety also 
could reduce medical costs by decreasing expenditures on medical in-
terventions necessitated by medical error.  The potential savings is 
evident in findings that hospitals with the lowest error costs impose 
only $42 in error-related costs per patient admission, whereas those 
with the highest error costs impose expected error costs of $4769 per 
patient admission.38  Overall, the average patient admitted bears a cost 
of more than $1240 due to errors attributable to hospital medical 
management.39  Thus, many hospitals could save lives and lower health 
care costs by reducing the risk of error.40 
Physicians and hospitals do not invest adequately in patient safety 
unless they are held liable for their medical errors.  Without effective 
malpractice liability, providers underinvest in safety because, absent liabil-
ity, providers can lower their costs by reducing safety investments without 
ultimately paying the full burden of the resulting increase in error.41 
Market forces do not ensure that providers bear the costs of pa-
tient injuries because patients do not have accurate information about 
 
36 Hospitals also can decrease error by investing in health care technology, such as 
computerized physician order entry systems that reduce drug errors.  See GAWANDE, 
supra note 31, at 63.  In addition, U.S. hospitals could substantially reduce deadly hos-
pital-induced infections by adopting better procedures akin to those used in Europe, 
where hospitals have nearly eliminated the risk of hospital-acquired, antibiotic-resistant 
staphylococcus.  See Kevin Sack, Swabs in Hand, Hospital Cuts Deadly Infections, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A1. 
37 Physician exhaustion produced by long hospital shifts is a known cause of medi-
cal error.  See Drew Dawson & Kathryn Reid, Fatigue, Alcohol and Performance Impairment, 
388 NATURE 235, 235 (1997) (finding that people kept awake for 24 hours suffered a 
deficit in cognitive psychomotor performance “equivalent to the performance deficit 
observed at a blood alcohol concentration of roughly 0.10%”); Christopher P. Landri-
gan et al., Effect of Reducing Interns’ Work Hours on Serious Medical Errors in Intensive Care 
Units, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1838, 1842 (2004) (finding that interns on the traditional 
extended schedule made 35.9% more “serious medical errors” than did interns on a 
lighter schedule).  
38 See Mello et al., supra note 27, at 847.  
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 836 (noting the “strong business [rationale]” for investing in safety im-
provements); see also Danzon, supra note 1, at 1353-54 (describing a study finding that 
hospitals vary widely in their error rates, with some having a negligent-error rate of on-
ly 1% and others having a negligent-error rate of 60%—a disparity that could not be 
entirely explained by differences in illnesses and patient populations).   
41 See Mello et al., supra note 27, at 837-38 (finding that hospitals do not bear the 
cost of the extra medical care required by medical errors attributable to them).  
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differences in provider quality.42  Thus, patients’ demand and willing-
ness to pay for physicians’ services do not adjust to reflect differences 
in expected outcomes.  In addition, patients’ welfare depends on their 
providers’ investments in quality postcontract, after the patients have 
selected the provider.43  Accordingly, absent liability, hospitals and 
physicians do not face a sufficient penalty for excessive error to induce 
them to invest optimally in patient safety.44 
 
42 Most patients believe that physicians and hospitals do not differ significantly in 
the quality of care they provide because they believe that health care regulation has 
eliminated any significant differences in physician or hospital quality.  Jacquelyn J. Je-
wett & Judith H. Hibbard, Comprehension of Quality Care Indicators:  Differences Among Pri-
vately Insured, Publicly Insured, and Uninsured, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 75, 90 
(1996); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & QUAL-
ITY, NATIONAL SURVEY ON AMERICANS AS HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS:  AN UPDATE ON 
THE ROLE OF QUALITY INFORMATION, at Summary § 1 (2000) (finding that only 47% of 
patients believed that there were big differences in the quality of care between local 
hospitals); cf. Mark R. Chassin et al., Benefits and Hazards of Reporting Medical Outcomes 
Publicly, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 394, 394-95 (1996) (showing that public reporting of 
evidence identifying higher-risk physicians and hospitals did not affect patients’ wil-
lingness to seek services from these providers).  Patients’ belief that provider quality is 
constant stands in contrast with empirical evidence that licensed medical providers dif-
fer significantly in the quality of care they deliver. See supra text accompanying notes 
38-40 (discussing the variation in error rates across providers).  
43 Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 3, at 510-12 (showing that, absent liability, physi-
cians underinvest in postcontractual care). 
44 See id. at 507-08 (showing that, absent liability, even compassionate physicians 
have an incentive to underinvest in patient safety); see also Michael Spence, Consumer 
Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 563-64 
(1977) (showing that liability is needed to induce producers to invest optimally in 
product quality if consumers underestimate product risks).  
 Malpractice liability is needed notwithstanding recent efforts to provide patients 
with better information about providers’ quality because current disclosure policies 
tend to be quite limited.  For example, most disclosure policies only inform patients 
whether a provider (e.g., a hospital) follows specific safety practices and do not dis-
close patient outcomes. See, e.g., Leslie P. Kernisan et al., Association Between Hospital-
Reported Leapfrog Safe Practices Scores and Inpatient Mortality, 301 JAMA 1341, 1348 (2009) 
(finding that higher Leapfrog safe practice scores were not associated with significant 
risk-adjusted decreases in inpatient mortality in the 1075 hospitals that completed 
Leapfrog’s 2006 Safe Practices Survey); see also Meredith B. Rosenthal & R. Adams 
Dudley, Pay-for-Performance:  Will the Latest Payment Trend Improve Care?, 297 JAMA 740, 
741 tbl. (2007) (showing that 91% of pay-for-performance “programs target clinical 
quality measures,” while only 37% “include patient satisfaction measures”).  This li-
mited disclosure does not provide incentives for providers to invest in safety measures 
that are not subject to disclosure requirements.  See Peter K. Lindenauer et al., Public 
Reporting and Pay for Performance in Hospital Quality Improvement, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
486, 486 (2007) (finding that patient outcomes are better when hospitals have direct 
financial incentives to avoid poor outcomes than they do when hospitals only volunta-
rily report information about quality). 
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When properly designed, medical malpractice liability can be used 
to redress this market failure.45  Effective malpractice liability en-
hances the welfare of patients and providers alike by giving providers 
a direct financial incentive to make cost-effective investments in pa-
tient safety, even when patients cannot observe quality differences 
among providers.46  These investments include investments in exper-
tise, administrative systems, and health care technology designed to 
reduce providers’ risk of accidentally harming patients.  Many of these 
investments benefit both current and future patients.  A well-designed 
malpractice liability system that induces these investments could save 
both lives and billions of dollars.  These benefits compare favorably 
with the costs of liability, which run about one to two percent of total 
 
45 See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 3, at 503-04 (showing that physicians will invest 
optimally in patient safety and MCOs will make optimal decisions regarding utilization 
review if each is subject to optimal medical malpractice liability); see also Abraham & 
Weiler, supra note 19, at 410-11 (arguing that hospital enterprise liability could provide 
effective incentives for hospitals and physicians to reduce medical error); Havighurst,  
supra note 6, at 27 (claiming that MCO tort liability will improve incentives to take care 
by shifting focus from cost control to overall efficiency). 
 Empirical evidence suggests that liability and other financial sanctions for bad 
outcomes can improve the quality of medical care patients receive.  See, e.g., Janet Cur-
rie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q.J. 
ECON. 795, 797 (2008) (finding that caps on noneconomic damages increase compli-
cations in labor and delivery, as would be expected if liability deters procedures that 
increase risk); Lindenauer et al., supra note 44, at 486 (finding that hospitals provide 
superior quality care when given direct financial incentives to avoid bad outcomes); see 
also TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 108-10 (2005) (explaining how the 
high malpractice liability costs of the 1980s induced the American Society of Anesthe-
siologists to adopt reforms that reduced death rates from anesthesia to four per one 
million patients—lowering malpractice liability insurance rates substantially); Danzon, 
supra note 1, at 1341 (“The limited empirical evidence of provider response to liability 
and the deterrent effect of claims suggests—but cannot prove—that the net benefits of 
the malpractice system may plausibly be positive.”); cf. Mello & Brennan, supra note 19, 
at 1604-05 (presenting evidence that malpractice liability may improve hospitals’ safety 
records, but noting that the evidence on liability’s deterrent effect is mixed). 
46 Evidence suggests that malpractice liability is sufficiently accurate to achieve its 
deterrence goals if properly designed.  See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, 
and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 
2028 fig.1 (2006) (providing evidence that 82% (653/798) of the malpractice claims in 
which patients received a payment involved injuries attributable to medical error).  See 
generally BAKER, supra note 45, at 83-87 (discussing empirical evidence on litigation ac-
curacy); Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 1933 (examining the optimal scope of 
physician and MCO negligence liability for medical malpractice); Philip G. Peters, Jr., 
What We Know About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783, 1803-05 (2007) (pre-
senting empirical evidence suggesting that settlement outcomes are driven by the 
strength of a plaintiff’s case); infra note 75 (discounting claims that malpractice liabili-
ty is random).  
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health care costs47—amounting to a surcharge of about $10 to $20 on 
the annual health care costs of a patient spending $1000 per year on 
health care. 
Unfortunately, malpractice liability cannot achieve its full deter-
rence potential unless it is reformed.48  This observation raises two 
questions.  First, what is the best way to achieve malpractice liability 
reform:  Should state courts and legislatures implement needed re-
forms, or should states delegate authority over malpractice reform to 
patients by allowing them to contract over liability with medical pro-
viders?  Second, what provisions should these reforms contain; specifi-
cally, should states reforming malpractice liability permit patients to 
contract out of it? 
B.  The Traditional Economic Argument for Contracting  
over Malpractice Liability 
Contractual liability proponents argue that contracting holds the 
answers to both questions, claiming that states should allow patients 
and medical providers to adjust the malpractice liability rules that go-
vern their relationship by contract. 
The strongest proponents claim that states should use contracting 
over liability as the primary mechanism for reforming malpractice lia-
bility.  Specifically, they argue that states can best reform malpractice 
liability by allowing patients to contract over liability.49  These propo-
nents believe that contracting is an effective reform mechanism be-
cause they assume that patients internalize all the costs and benefits of 
malpractice liability, and its reform, when they impose it by contract.  
They thus conclude that informed patients have optimal incentives to 
impose contractual liability whenever—and in the same form that—a 
 
47 See Danzon, supra note 1, at 1343 (“Malpractice [liability insurance] premiums 
account for roughly 1% of total health care spending, hence are not a significant con-
tributor to the level or growth of health care costs.”); BAKER, supra note 45, at 40 
(same); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 909 
(1993) (“[T]he idea that containing medical liability costs will make any appreciable 
dent in health care costs is absurd.”).  The amount spent on medical malpractice liabil-
ity premiums is far less (one-fifth to one-tenth the size) than the amount spent on ei-
ther workers’ compensation or automobile insurance, even though substantially more 
people are killed by medical malpractice each year than by workplace and automobile 
accidents combined.  See BAKER, supra note 45, at 63. 
48 See infra Section II.A (discussing the problems plaguing the current system). 
49 See, e.g., Epstein, Contractual Principle, supra note 5, at 505-06; see also Hylton, su-
pra note 5, at 209-10.  
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benevolent state, acting in patients’ collective best interests, would do 
so.  Accordingly, state action is not needed.50 
Other proponents want states to play a role in malpractice liability 
reform, but claim that malpractice liability reform should include a 
provision allowing patients to contract over liability, on the grounds 
that informed patients can only benefit from the right to contract.51  
According to proponents, contractual liability cannot harm informed 
patients because all informed patients who would have benefited from 
reformed malpractice liability imposed by the state would contract to 
retain this liability, for the same benefit and cost as when it was state 
imposed.  The only patients who would contract out of liability are 
those who would not have fared well under state-imposed liability.52 
Proponents’ faith in the optimality of contracting has led them to 
conclude that contractual liability is not just equal to malpractice lia-
bility, it is superior to it.  According to proponents, contracting has 
two advantages over mandatory liability.  First, contractual liability is 
superior because it places control over liability with the people (pa-
tients and providers) who directly experience—and thus are in a bet-
ter position to evaluate—the benefits and costs of malpractice liability.  
Second, contractual liability is superior because it allows liability 
rules—and thus investments in safety—to vary across patients.  Varia-
tion is important because patients differ significantly in their willing-
ness (and ability) to pay for safety.  Contractual liability allows each 
patient to contract for the level of care that she is willing and able to 
pay for.  Thus, even states that reform malpractice liability could only 
benefit patients by allowing them to contract over liability, because 
contracting would allow those patients who would prefer a different 
standard of care to obtain it by contract.  Contracting could achieve 
this benefit without imposing costs on informed patients who value 
 
50 See Epstein, Contractual Principle, supra note 5, at 505 (arguing that malpractice 
liability reform could be best achieved by allowing patients to contract with providers 
over liability); see also Danzon, supra note 6, at 517-18 (criticizing state legislative pro-
posals that would extend liability to all MCOs rather than deferring to contract terms); 
Epstein & Sykes, supra note 6, at 625-27 (arguing against reforms seeking to impose 
mandatory liability on MCOs on the grounds that any such liability should be contrac-
tual); Robinson, supra note 5, at 198-99 (claiming that state-imposed liability may not 
be necessary if private parties are free to determine liability by contract).  
51 See Epstein, Contractual Principle, supra note 5, at 505-06.  
52 Proposals for states to adopt entity-level liability while permitting patients and 
providers to contract around it fall into this category.  See supra note 6.  
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state-imposed liability, proponents claim, because these patients can, 
and will, replicate state-imposed liability and its benefits by contract.53 
C.  Requirements for Optimal Contracting over Liability 
Proponents’ claim that states cannot hurt informed patients by 
giving them the right to contract over liability depends critically on 
their assumption that each informed patient has optimal incentives to 
contract into liability.  This assumption is satisfied only if two condi-
tions are met.  First, patients must obtain the same benefit when they 
impose liability by contract as they would have gotten had the state 
imposed their preferred liability regime by fiat.  Thus, each patient 
who imposes liability by contract must produce the same increase in 
her providers’ investments in patient safety as she would obtain if the 
state imposed the same liability rule by fiat.54  Second, providers must 
 
53  For a summary of the conventional economic case for contract, see, for exam-
ple, PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 96 (1991); Epstein, Contractual 
Principle, supra note 5, at 507-08; and Robinson, supra note 5, at 183-84. 
54 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler focus their defense of contractual liability on 
the compensatory role of tort liability and largely ignore deterrence concerns.  THALER 
& SUNSTEIN, supra note 5.  Yet one cannot assert, as they do, that patients would be 
better off if allowed to contract over liability without considering the effect of contrac-
tual liability on patients’ ability to use liability to induce providers to invest in patient 
safety.  Deterrence is particularly important since leading reforms would make mal-
practice more effective.  See sources cited supra note 45; infra Section II.A; see also Ab-
raham & Weiler, supra note 19, at 410-11 (explaining how hospital liability would 
create better incentives to reduce medical error); Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 
1993-95 (showing how MCO liability would reduce medical error).  Thus, we should 
not embrace contractual liability unless proponents can show that it would not hurt 
patients who would benefit from the deterrence that state-imposed malpractice liability 
could be designed to provide.   
 Beyond this, contractual liability is hard to justify solely on compensation grounds.  
First, for many patients the expected cost of using liability solely to obtain compensa-
tion exceeds the expected benefit.  Providers subject to liability must charge an addi-
tional fee equal to the expected cost to the provider of bearing liability.  Were com-
pensation the only effect of liability, the amount that providers would charge for 
liability would exceed the benefit of liability for the vast majority of patients.  The pro-
vider’s premium would reflect the expected damage award plus her litigation costs, 
whereas the patient would receive the damage award net of her litigation costs, pro-
ducing a total load of more than 50%.  Moreover, risk averse patients could insure 
more cheaply through first-party insurance.  Thus, states interested only in compensat-
ing injured patients could achieve this goal more effectively by adopting no-fault or 
social insurance for medical error, because liability takes too long and is too expensive 
to provide patients with effective insurance.  See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 1, at 1369 
(observing that 60 cents of each dollar spent on medical malpractice liability insurance 
is lost to either litigation costs or administrative expenses, and only 40 cents reaches 
the patient as compensation; by contrast, 90 cents of each dollar spent on first-party 
insurance is available for compensation); Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Re-
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face incentives to charge patients imposing liability an amount equal 
to the direct cost to the provider of assuming liability—this being the 
cost to the provider of the increased investment in care induced by 
liability plus the expected cost of compensation. 
Proponents have never shown that contractual malpractice liabili-
ty satisfies these requirements.  They have relied instead on economic 
analyses of products liability which find that consumers can use con-
tractual liability to obtain the same increase in producers’ investment 
in care, both postcontract and precontract, as would result from iden-
tical state-imposed liability.55  Proponents of contractual malpractice 
liability have implicitly assumed that these analyses apply to contracting 
over medical malpractice liability as well.  The validity of this claim de-
pends on whether these classic models capture the essential economic 
structure of contracting over malpractice liability. 
1.  Costs of Contractual Versus State-Imposed Liability 
Existing analyses of contractual products liability find that patients 
pay the same price for liability whether it is imposed by contract or by 
the state.  Both types of liability increase producer costs by inducing 
investments in safety and requiring them to pay compensation to in-
jured victims.  Accordingly, whether subject to state-imposed liability 
or contractual liability, a producer operating in a competitive market 
passes these costs on to consumers.56  Producers do not overcharge for 
liability, it is assumed, because competitive market forces keep prices 
equal to marginal cost.  Thus, the price for liability, whether imposed 
 
place the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 
627-32 (1998) (arguing that third-party insurance provided through the tort system is 
more expensive than first-party insurance); cf. Studdert et al., supra note 46, at 2026-27 
tbl.1 (finding that median defense-side costs in paid claims were $27,954, which is 
about 13.5% of the median payment of $206,400).  
55 See, e.g., Sanford Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclo-
sure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 463 (1981) (showing that nonnegotiable 
contracting over warranties can induce producers to invest optimally in product quali-
ty, assuming that consumers independently value liability for insurance reasons); 
George L. Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347 (1981) 
(showing that market forces will pressure producers to offer full warranties, thereby 
providing incentives for them to invest optimally in postcontractual quality); Spence, 
supra note 44, at 569-70 (showing that contracting over liability will lead to efficient 
product markets when producers can use voluntary liability to signal quality); see also 
Hylton, supra note 5, at 222 (presenting a model of contracting over waivers that im-
plicitly assumes that accidents depend only on an injurer’s postcontractual decision to 
take care to benefit one person).  
56 Patients pay these costs either directly, in the form of higher medical bills, or 
indirectly, through higher health insurance premiums. 
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by the state or by contract, equals the cost to the producer of the safe-
ty investments induced by liability plus the expected compensation.  If 
this analysis applies to medical markets as well, patients contracting 
over liability would bear the full cost of liability—and no more than 
the full cost—whether liability is imposed by contract or by the state.57 
2.  Deterrence Benefits of Contractual Versus State-Imposed Liability 
Economic analyses of products liability also find that patients ob-
tain the same benefit from liability whether it is imposed by the state 
or by contract.  They find that liability enables consumers to obtain 
the same reduction in the risk of injury whether it is imposed by con-
tract or by the state.  This conclusion holds even when the risk of in-
jury depends on investments in quality taken precontract, as well as on 
those taken postcontract.58  The economic argument for contractual 
malpractice liability assumes that these findings can be extrapolated to 
contracting over malpractice liability, as follows. 
a.  Postcontractual Care 
Patients seeking services from a provider benefit when the latter 
makes cost-effective investments designed to reduce the risk of medi-
cal error after agreeing to treat the patient.59  State-imposed malprac-
tice liability uses the threat of liability imposed for medical error to 
give providers a direct financial incentive to make these investments.  
Contractual liability proponents assume that patients can replicate 
these incentives to invest in postcontractual care by imposing liability 
by contract.  They reason that medical providers should have the same 
incentive to invest in safety whether faced with a threat of medical 
negligence liability imposed by the state or as a result of a contract.60 
 
57 See Priest, supra note 55; Spence, supra note 44; see also Hylton, supra note 5. 
58 See sources cited infra note 63. 
59 Postcontractual expertise is important because best medical practices change so 
quickly that physicians cannot reliably select the right treatment without continually 
investing in expertise.  Cf. Annetine C. Gelijns et al., Uncertainty and Technological 
Change in Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 913, 914 (2001) (noting that “approx-
imately 35% of the 200 largest selling prescription drugs are new each year,” and in 
one year alone the Food and Drug Administration approved approximately 5000 new 
and modified medical devices).   
60 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 55 (describing the investment theory of contractual 
liability, in which producers contract to bear liability when they are better able than 
consumers to reduce product risks); see also Hylton, supra note 5 (modeling contractual 
liability as a solution to producer moral hazard). 
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b.  Precontractual Care 
Proponents also assume that patients can use contractual liability to 
induce providers to invest in care precontract.  Precontractual care mat-
ters because physicians and hospitals dramatically affect expected pa-
tient outcomes by investing in their ability to provide error-free care in 
advance of delivering care.  These investments, which include durable 
investments in expertise, administrative systems, health care technology, 
and supervision, benefit future patients as well as current ones.61 
Medical caregivers subject to well-designed malpractice liability 
imposed by the state have every reason to make cost-effective invest-
ments in durable care because these investments reduce their future 
expected liability.62  Thus, they will invest in safety measures that are 
cost-effective in light of their effect on the risk of injury to both current 
and future patients.  Accordingly, state-imposed malpractice liability 
benefits patients by inducing providers to invest in care precontract, 
prior to any contractual relationship with the patient. 
Proponents assume that contractual liability can replicate this 
benefit—inducing providers to invest in precontractual care—even 
though patients do not impose contractual liability until after precon-
tractual investments are fixed.  This assumption is based on classic 
economic analyses of contracting over products liability.  Economic 
analyses of products liability have shown that the right to contract over 
liability can induce producers to make precontractual investments in 
care, even when care is unobservable, because producers who do so can 
use contractual liability to signal that they are of higher quality and  
thereby obtain a higher price.  High-quality providers can signal their 
quality by offering to bear liability at a price equal to their expected cost 
of liability whenever low-quality providers cannot mimic this offer with-
out bearing a liability burden that exceeds the benefit of pretending to 
be high quality.63  The ability to signal quality through contractual liabil-
ity gives producers incentives to invest in precontractual care in order to 
 
61 See supra Section I.A.   
62 Providers will not make durable investments that are cost-effective in light of 
their benefit to all patients if the providers do not benefit from the effect of durable 
investments on future patients; they will only make investments that are cost-effective 
given their benefit to current patients.  
63 See Spence, supra note 44, at 569-70 (showing that producers can use voluntary 
nonnegotiable liability to signal product quality, thereby enabling consumers to pur-
chase the quality of product they prefer); see also Grossman, supra note 55, at 474-77 
(showing that a monopolist will offer a full warranty, even when consumers cannot ob-
serve product quality, in order to avoid the negative price effect of signaling poor qual-
ity by offering an incomplete warranty).  
ARLEN_FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2010  10:58 AM 
2010] Contracting over Liability 981 
be able to attract consumers by offering liability contracts.  When high-
quality providers can use liability to signal quality, each patient obtains 
the same safety benefit from contracting into liability as from state-
imposed liability, because liability contracts are offered by providers 
who made greater investments in precontractual care. 
3.  Perceived Strength of the Claim for Contract 
The proposition that patients get the same deterrence benefits 
from liability, at the same price, whether it is imposed by tort or by 
contract, has led both proponents and opponents of contractual lia-
bility to conclude that contractual liability cannot hurt informed pa-
tients.  Opponents nevertheless object to contracting because they be-
lieve that patients are not sufficiently informed to contract on their 
own behalf.64  This imperfect information objection has not weakened 
proponents’ enthusiasm for contract, however.  Proponents believe 
that patients are sufficiently informed to contract effectively over lia-
bility.65  Moreover, they assert that, even if information problems do 
exist, states should respond by structuring contractual liability to en-
sure that patients are informed, instead of rejecting contracting alto-
gether.  This position is garnering increasing support.66 
D.  Inapplicability of Classic Analyses to Malpractice Liability 
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of this analysis, closer 
examination of contracting in medical care markets reveals reasons to 
suspect that contractual malpractice liability cannot replicate the incen-
tive effects of tort liability at an equivalent price.67  Although propo-
nents assume contractual liability does nothing more than expand the 
choices available to patients, this is not the case.  In fact, the introduc-
 
64 A related objection to contractual liability is that contracting would be under-
mined by behavioral biases that may cause patients to act contrary to their own inter-
ests.  See Baker & Lytton, supra note 10, at 5-12. 
65 See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 6 (positing that information problems asso-
ciated with MCO contractual liability are not significant); see also Ramseyer, supra note 
11, at 1825 (asserting that claims that consumers are not sufficiently informed to con-
tract over products liability are empirically “questionable”); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 
380 (concluding that the evidence on consumers’ approach to product risks “more 
strongly supports the view that consumers are informed than the view that they are ig-
norant”); cf. Mark Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Prod-
ucts Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1988) (discussing how pricing mechan-
isms for warranties can be modified to reduce information problems). 
66 See sources cited supra note 12. 
67 See supra note 17. 
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tion of contracting fundamentally alters the scope of liability that pa-
tients can impose in ways that harm many patients.  Whereas malprac-
tice liability is a collective, pooled, multiprovider form of liability 
posed by all patients on all providers now and in the future, contractual 
liability is a far narrower form of liability, imposed by only one patient 
(or set of patients), on one provider (or a limited group), for a limited 
period of time.  The economic case for contract thus is correct only if 
this fundamental change in the structure and scope of liability neither 
reduces the deterrence benefit of liability nor increases its cost. 
 
Table 1:  Tort Liability Versus Contractual Liability 
 
 Tort Liability Contractual Liability 
Patients Covered Liable to All Patients Liable Only to Parties 
to Contract 
Timing of Liability Liable to All  
Future Patients 
Liability to Future  
Patients Not Guaranteed 
Physicians Bound Affects All Physicians Only Affects Parties to Contract 
Liability Signals 
Patient Costliness 
No Signal:  Liability 
Automatic 
Patients Selecting Liability Signal 
Information About Themselves 
 
Proponents implicitly assume that these structural changes do not 
matter because the economic models on which they rely—classic eco-
nomic models of products liability—find that contractual liability is 
equivalent to state-imposed malpractice liability.  Yet these classic ana-
lyses depend on a series of assumptions about the structure of cus-
tomer-producer relationships that differ fundamentally from the rela-
tionships among physicians, patients, and insurers. 
First, the classic models of contractual products liability assume 
that consumers’ liability choices are independent.  In these models, 
each consumer who imposes liability only affects the expected safety 
of the product she purchases, and in turn is only affected by her own 
liability choices.  By contrast, in medical markets, patients’ liability 
choices are not independent because patients’ welfare is affected by 
safety investments, such as expertise and administrative systems, which 
benefit many patients collectively. 
Second, the classic models generally assume that producers make 
take-it-or-leave-it offers to consumers.  Yet contracting between indi-
vidual patients and physicians at the moment of treatment would oc-
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cur face-to-face.  Patients in theory would be able to negotiate over 
liability with providers. 
Third, in the classic models, the cost to a producer of selling a 
product with liability depends only on the quality of the product, and is 
not affected by the noncontractable characteristics of the purchaser.  
Thus, each producer charges a price surcharge for liability equal to the 
per-consumer cost of liability to the producer (this being the quality in-
vestments induced by liability plus the expected cost of compensation).  
By contrast, in the medical context, it is more costly for medical provid-
ers to assume liability for and deliver care to some patients than others. 
Finally, the classic models assume that the marginal cost to each 
producer of delivering a particular level of care is unaffected by other 
producers’ decisions about how much to invest in safety.  By contrast, 
medical care is characterized by network externalities in that the cost 
of providing care is lower when providers standardize treatment pro-
tocols, since this lowers the cost of training medical providers and de-
livering care. 
Accordingly, relationships in medical markets are more interde-
pendent, and less stable, than those captured by the classic economic 
models of products liability.  Therefore, before we can accept the 
claims of contractual malpractice liability proponents, we must direct-
ly examine whether patients contracting into malpractice liability do 
in fact derive the same benefit, at the same price, as they would derive 
from malpractice liability imposed by fiat.68  This Article thoroughly 
examines patients’ incentives to contract over malpractice liability 
with both individual physicians and insurers, taking explicit account 
of the institutional structure of medical care markets.  It analyzes both 
the claim that contracting would produce efficient reforms and the 
claim that contracting is an efficient component of malpractice 
reform.  It shows that both claims are incorrect. 
 
68 The proposition that we must directly consider whether contractual malpractice 
liability is efficient, rather than relying on analyses of products liability, is strengthened 
by economic analyses of health care that have identified numerous inefficiencies pla-
guing other types of health care contracts.  See generally Joseph P. Newhouse, The Eco-
nomics of Health Insurance (finding that contracting in health care markets is distorted 
by moral hazard, adverse selection, and other problems), in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 872-75 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d 
ed. 2008).  As a result of these inefficiencies, certain health care contracts, specifically 
health insurance policies, are regulated.  Accordingly, before embracing contractual 
liability it is important to determine whether the inefficiencies that plague other 
health care contracts also would afflict malpractice liability contracts.  
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Since the costs and benefits of contracting depend on the type of 
contracting employed, this Article considers two different forms of 
contractual liability, focusing on the two that have garnered the most 
support, and have the most plausible claim to being optimal.  The first 
is individual contracting between patients and medical providers at 
the moment that patients seek medical care (point of service contract-
ing).  When considering this form of contracting, this Article assumes 
that liability contracts are fully negotiable at the point of service.  The 
second is contracting between patients and health insurers to govern 
liability for both insurers and individual providers.  This analysis as-
sumes that contracting occurs through standard form contracts of-
fered to patients on a take-it-or-leave-it basis when they sign up for 
health insurance.69  In order to focus the analysis on the core econom-
ic argument that informed patients benefit from the right to contract, 
this Article assumes that patients are rational and can accurately assess 
the costs and benefits of imposing liability.70 
II.  MALPRACTICE REFORM THROUGH NEGOTIABLE  
INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTING 
This Part examines contractual liability proponents’ most ambi-
tious claim:  that individual contracting over liability is an optimal me-
chanism to implement malpractice liability reform because patients 
would contract with individual providers for the reforms that maxim-
ize their welfare.71  To examine the issue, this Part focuses on the form 
of individual point of service contracting that best facilitates voluntary 
contracting:  contracts negotiated between patients and providers at 
 
69 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
70 This Article assumes for argument’s sake that consumers are informed about 
the costs and benefits of imposing liability in order to evaluate contractual liability in 
the most favorable light.  Nevertheless, patients may not be sufficiently informed to 
contract effectively.  See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 22, at 253-54, 263-64 (discussing infor-
mation problems afflicting contractual malpractice liability); see also Mark Geistfeld, 
The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 803 (1994) (same); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to 
Health Problems:  Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 494-
96 (1987) (finding that people underestimate the probability that they will fall ill, and 
thus underestimate the probability that they will need medical care). 
71 See, e.g., Epstein, Contractual Principle, supra note 5, at 509 (asserting that legisla-
tive solutions to the liability problem are inferior to solutions that allow patients to 
contract over liability).  The separate claim that patients would benefit from the ability 
to contract over the standard of care is considered in Part V. 
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the point of service.72  To test whether patients and providers would 
indeed contract individually for all optimal reforms, this Part examines 
whether patients would contract individually to impose liability on med-
ical entities (hospitals or MCOs) for all medical negligence whenever 
patients would benefit if the state imposed this reform by fiat.73 
This Part demonstrates that informed patients would not contract 
to impose liability on medical entities whenever they would benefit if 
the state imposed this reform by fiat because patients get less benefit 
from imposing this reform individually by contract than when it is im-
posed collectively.  This is because medical-entity liability is a collective 
good.  Thus, patients may not contract into this reform even when 
they would all benefit if the state adopted it.  In addition, individual 
contracting is an excessively expensive way to obtain reforms that 
should be widely adopted. 
A.  The Need for and Benefits of Medical-Entity Liability Reform 
Contractual liability proponents’ faith that contracting is an effec-
tive mechanism for reforming tort liability often appears to be predi-
cated on the assumption that the central problem with malpractice 
liability is that there is too much of it.  This view leads naturally to a 
favorable assessment of contractual liability because contracting would 
reduce the scope of malpractice liability.74 
Yet the empirical literature on malpractice liability does not sup-
port the conclusion that the best way to improve malpractice liability 
is to reduce or eliminate it.  Instead, empirical analysis suggests that 
the core problems plaguing malpractice liability are that:  (1) medical 
providers with higher-than-average error rates face too little liability for 
their errors, and (2) the medical entities whose actions directly affect 
 
72 This Article focuses on negotiable individual contracting because it is the most 
choice-enhancing form of contracting.  Also, standard form contracting with individual 
providers would be rendered inefficient by information costs, search costs, and medi-
cal duress if not publicly disclosed in advance of the patient seeking care.  Should pro-
viders disclose their standard form contracts on the web, then individual contracting 
would be plagued by adverse selection, in addition to the problems discussed above.  
See discussion infra note 123. 
73 This Article focuses on medical-entity liability because this reform has garnered 
broad support from medical malpractice liability experts.  See sources cited supra notes 6, 19. 
74 This Article shows that contracting over liability would dramatically reduce the 
amount of malpractice liability, but only by hurting patients who would have benefited 
from state-imposed liability. 
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medical quality also do not face sufficient tort liability to induce them 
to adequately invest in patient safety.75 
Physicians with higher-than-average error rates do not bear the 
full expected cost of their errors because the vast majority of patients 
injured by medical error do not sue.76  In addition, patients who do 
 
75 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 19, at 408; Mello & Brennan, supra note 19, at 
1616-17.  Another problem plaguing malpractice liability is that neither the standard 
of care nor damages are set optimally.  See Jennifer Arlen, Tort Damages (showing that 
under current legal rules governing damages for serious personal injury and death, 
injurers’ expected damages are too low to induce them to take due care and engage in 
optimal activity levels), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 682, 718 (Boude-
wijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Danzon, supra note 1, at 1347-48 (ar-
guing that the current practice of predicting negligence determinations based on 
medical custom biases the standard of care in favor of excessive care when the custom 
was established by physicians treating patients with fee-for-service health insurance); 
Paul C. Weiler, Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically Moderate—and Ethical—
Fashion, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 205, 217-218 (2005) (advocating for damage reforms that 
include a schedule for noneconomic damages).  
 By contrast, the evidence does not support the oft-repeated claim that malpractice 
liability is random, falling on physicians regardless of whether they erred.  Instead, stu-
dies find that the vast majority of malpractice claimants who receive payments were 
injured by medical error.  See supra note 46.  Scholars who argue that malpractice lia-
bility is random generally cite the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) to support 
this claim.  Yet the HMPS cannot be used to assess litigation accuracy because it in-
cluded too few malpractice lawsuits to produce any statistically significant results about 
the quality of litigation outcomes.  Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice, in 2 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 624, 626 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998).  In addition, the HMPS should not be used to analyze litigation accuracy be-
cause it was designed to provide a conservative estimate of medical error and not to 
assess litigation accuracy.  It thus employed a protocol for identifying medical negli-
gence that underestimates the amount of negligence.  First, the study relied solely on 
written hospital records and research, which often fail to document medical errors.  See 
Andrews, supra note 28, at 370 (finding that more than 60% of the patients seriously in-
jured by medical error were “not brought to the hospital’s attention” through either writ-
ten occurrence reports or potential claims files).  Second, the HMPS coded the injury as 
not attributable to error if either one of the two physician reviewers concluded that no 
error occurred, even if the other reviewer concluded that the patient’s injury was caused 
by medical error.  See BAKER, supra note 45, at 28-29 (discussing the HMPS); cf. Michelle 
M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship:  The State of the Field, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 649, 682-84 (2008) (concluding that the debate over malpractice liability reform has 
not been adequately informed by controlled empirical studies, but has instead been over-
ly influenced by preconceptions supported by uncontrolled descriptive studies).  
76 Indeed, on average a provider who errs is sued only 10% to 12% of the time.  
PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:  THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
23-24 (1985) (describing a study showing that only 10% of patients injured by a negli-
gent adverse event filed a medical malpractice case); see also Andrews, supra note 28, at 
370 (finding that although 185 patients in a Chicago hospital (17.7%) were the victims 
of a medical error producing a serious injury, only thirteen patients (1.2%) brought a 
claim); Danzon, supra note 1, at 1354 (noting that in the HMPS, less than 15% of neg-
ligent injuries produced a malpractice claim); David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care 
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file suit often do not recover even when they have legitimate claims.77  
Finally, high-error physicians are insulated from the cost of their er-
rors by medical malpractice liability insurance.  Physicians rarely pay 
directly out of pocket for malpractice claims imposed on them.78  Nor 
do physicians bear the full cost of their errors indirectly through their 
medical malpractice liability insurance premiums for two reasons.  
First, physicians often set their policy limits below their patients’ ex-
pected losses.79  Second, malpractice liability insurance premiums are 
not experience-rated, so high-error providers do not pay higher pre-
miums than lower-error providers in the same medical specialty.80 
Another weakness of the current system is that it does not provide 
adequate incentives for hospitals and MCOs to invest in patient safety.  
Although many errors are attributable to hospitals’ administrative sys-
tems, patients generally cannot recover for injuries resulting from sys-
tems problems unless they can identify an individual act of negli-
gence.  As a result, hospitals do not have adequate incentives to make 
 
and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 255 (2000) 
(finding that 97% of the patients who suffered negligent injury did not sue).  
77 Studdert et al., supra note 46, at 2028 (finding that 27% of the victims of medi-
cal error who filed claims did not recover); see also Lee D. Cranberg et al., Do the Claims 
Hold Up?  A Study of Medical Negligence Claims Against Neurologists, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 155, 161 (2007) (finding that a majority of the patients who filed valid claims 
against neurologists did not recover); David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, When 
Tort Resolutions Are “Wrong”:  Predictors of Discordant Outcomes in Medical Malpractice Liti-
gation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 547, 565 (2007) (finding that patients with valid claims are 
particularly likely to be denied recovery if they proceed to trial).   
78 Most doctors have malpractice liability insurance that covers the cost of any 
malpractice claims.  Indeed, insured doctors rarely pay out of pocket even when the 
damages awarded at trial exceed the limits of their policy because patients tend to set-
tle at the policy limits after trial.  David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries 
Award?  Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 7 (2007); Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Mal-
practice Payments:  Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S9, 
S10-11 (2007).   
79 See Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (Il)Legitimate Interests of the Medi-
cal Profession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 444 (2005) (concluding that mal-
practice liability premiums are lower than they would be if physicians paid the total 
cost of all medical negligence); supra note 78. 
80 Individual physician malpractice liability insurance premiums reflect a physi-
cian’s specialty and time in practice and location, but do not adjust to reflect a provid-
er’s individual claims experience.  See Danzon, supra note 1, at 1360-62; Mello & Bren-
nan, supra note 19, at 1616.  By contrast, hospital malpractice liability insurance is 
experience-rated.  See generally Geistfeld, supra note 79, at 444 (noting that individual 
physician malpractice insurance premiums are not experience-rated); William M. Sage, 
Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor’s Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 473 
(2005) (noting that physicians are charged premiums based on average loss expe-
rience in their specialty, not individual experience).  
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systemic investments to reduce the risk of error.81  MCOs, in turn, are 
insulated by federal law from liability for injuries resulting from negli-
gent decisions denying coverage for medically necessary treatments.82  
Finally, hospitals and MCOs both avoid liability for negligence of most 
(and in the case of most MCOs, all) of their affiliated physicians by 
employing them as independent contractors.  As a result, they do not 
have adequate incentives to screen and monitor the physicians prac-
ticing for them or within their facilities.83 
Contractual liability would be an effective mechanism for reform-
ing tort liability only if patients contracting over liability would be like-
ly to adopt the reforms best able to ameliorate these problems pla-
guing malpractice liability.  Many malpractice liability experts agree 
that medical-entity liability could be used to provide both individual 
physicians and medical entities with more effective incentives to invest 
in patient safety.84  Leading contractual liability proponents assert that 
the state need not intervene to adopt this reform but instead could re-
ly on patients to adopt this reform by contract if it benefits them.85  
This claim is not correct. 
B. Will Patients Contract for Medical-Entity Liability Reform? 
Even where all patients would benefit from state-imposed medical-
entity liability, patients contracting over liability would not impose this 
reform because each patient would get less benefit from contracting 
individually to impose medical-entity liability than she would get from 
medical-entity liability imposed by the state.  Thus, even if the benefit 
of medical-entity liability exceeds its cost when liability is state-
 
81 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 19, at 1620-21. 
82 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that ERISA 
preempts patients’ state tort actions against their health insurers for alleged failures to 
exercise reasonable care in handling insurance coverage decisions).  For a justification 
of MCO liability, see Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 1942-44. 
83 Hospitals often escape liability for negligence by hiring surgeons, anesthesiolo-
gists, and radiologists as independent contractors.  MCOs also generally hire physicians 
as independent contractors.  See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 1990 (arguing 
that optimal tort liability includes MCO liability for physician negligence).  See generally 
Jennifer H. Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant:  A Critique of Vicarious 
Liability (analyzing how the independent contractor rule distorts principle-agent rela-
tionships in ways that create excessive risk), in EXPLORING TORT LAW 111, 117-40 (M. 
Stuart Madden ed., 2005).  
84 See sources cited supra note 19; cf. Stephen M. Shortell & Sara J. Singer, Improv-
ing Patient Safety by Taking Systems Seriously, 299 JAMA 446-47 (2008) (arguing that health 
care organizations should be given financial incentives to protect patient safety). 
85 See sources cited supra note 6. 
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imposed, it would not be cost-effective for patients to contract for this 
reform individually. 
State-imposed medical-entity liability benefits patients by using the 
threat of liability for injuries to all patients to induce hospitals and 
MCOs to change their internal operations to reduce the risk of error.86  
Hospitals can reduce error by improving their administrative systems, 
providing better supervision of residents and interns, improving their 
health care technology, monitoring providers’ outcomes, and altering 
rules governing physicians’ work hours.  MCOs can reduce error by us-
ing their data on patient outcomes both to screen and monitor provid-
ers based on their error rates.  MCOs also could redraft their contracts 
to provide physicians and hospitals with incentives to improve quality.87 
Most of these measures confer a collective benefit on all (or most) 
of the patients served by the medical entity.  Thus, each medical enti-
ty’s incentive to invest in these measures depends on its liability to all 
of its patients.  Given this, medical entities would not invest as much in 
systems, monitoring, and health care technology when threatened with 
liability to one patient as when threatened with liability for injuries to all 
their patients.  Consequently, a patient imposing medical-entity liability 
through an individual contract would not produce as great a reduction 
 
86 MCOs and hospitals would be particularly responsive to malpractice liability be-
cause, unlike physicians, these entities either self-insure or purchase liability insurance 
that is experience-rated.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing expe-
rience-rating); see also Abraham & Weiler, supra note 19, at 410 (observing that one ad-
vantage of hospital liability is that insurers can charge medical entities liability insur-
ance premiums that “reliably reflect the prior claims experience of the particular 
institution”); Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 1990 n.205 (observing that one ad-
vantage of MCO liability is that MCOs would either self-insure or purchase experience-
rated malpractice liability insurance).    
87 Entities could use their monitoring information to induce physicians to reduce 
their error rates more effectively than is possible through the use of individual liability 
alone because entities possess direct evidence about providers’ per-patient outcomes 
(and direct evidence on error) even when no claim is filed.  Thus, entities could sanc-
tion providers who deliver inadequate care even if the patient did not file a claim.  
Moreover, entities can sanction physicians in ways not insulated by physician liability 
insurance.  Furthermore, entities could facilitate experience-rating of individual liabili-
ty insurance by sharing their information about physicians’ patient-health-adjusted 
outcomes.  Finally, entity-level liability would reduce the underclaiming problem be-
cause patients injured by medical care in a hospital would no longer be deterred from 
claiming by the difficulty of having to identify the individual responsible for their inju-
ries.  See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 1990-95 (discussing the benefits of MCO 
liability); see also Abraham & Weiler, supra note 19, at 398-400, 407-14 (explaining why 
hospital enterprise liability is a more effective mechanism for medical error than indi-
vidual physician liability); Mello & Brennan, supra note 19, at 1626 (asserting that one 
advantage of channeling liability costs through hospitals is that it facilitates experience-
rating of liability insurance).   
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in her risk of error as she could get if the state imposed liability by fiat 
because her individual threat to impose liability would not be sufficient 
to induce substantial investments by the entity in collective care. 
Indeed, a patient might get little benefit at all from imposing 
medical-entity liability individually even when she would benefit sub-
stantially from state-imposed liability.  Many of the cost-effective in-
vestments that entities can make to improve patient safety—such as 
administrative system overhaul, new health care technology, new mon-
itoring systems, and additional staff—are so expensive that they are 
cost-justified only when measured against their effect on all the pa-
tients who benefit from them.  They are not cost-effective when consi-
dered against their benefit to a single patient.88  Given this, medical 
entities would not adopt these reforms in response to the threat of 
liability to a single patient.  As a result, each individual patient con-
templating whether to impose entity liability by individual contract 
could rationally conclude that she would obtain no material safety 
benefit from doing so, even when she would benefit enormously if the 
state imposed medical-entity liability by fiat. 
Moreover, the possibility that other patients might impose entity 
liability does not solve this problem.  Patients are better off not con-
tracting to impose medical-entity liability, even when they expect others 
will do so, because the investments in care induced by other patients’ 
imposition of entity liability would confer collective benefits on all of 
the entities’ patients, including those who do not impose liability.89  Pa-
 
88 The expected liability imposed by any individual patient is not sufficiently high 
to justify a hospital making substantial expenditures based on liability to one patient.  
This is true even though the median award for valid claims is about $200,000.  Studdert 
et al., supra note 46, at 2027.  A profit-maximizing entity weighs the cost of a safety in-
vestment against its expected benefit, which depends on its expected potential liability to 
the patient.  This amount is the per-patient expected damage award if the patient is 
injured, sued, and recovers, adjusted to reflect the probability that (i) the patient im-
posing liability will be the victim of medical error, (ii) the injury will be serious, (iii) 
the victim will sue, and (iv) the plaintiff will be successful.  If we make these adjust-
ments, a median award of about $200,000 translates into an expected liability cost of 
only $328, assuming that 9% of patients are the victims of medical error, see discussion 
supra note 33, 25% produce serious injuries, and that only 10% of these serious injuries 
result in malpractice claims, see discussion supra note 76, of which only 73% lead to a vic-
tory for the patient, see Studdert et al., supra note 46, at 2028. Similarly, the average dam-
age award of $485,000 translates into a per-patient expected cost of liability of only $796. 
These costs are too low to induce a medical entity to make the substantial expenditures 
in administrative practices, personnel, and equipment purchases needed to reduce med-
ical error based on the threat of liability to a single patient.  
89 Hospitals benefit all of their patients when they reform administrative practices 
to improve hand-off procedures, the supervision of residents and interns, and the 
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tients thus can obtain these benefits by free-riding on others’ liability 
choices, avoiding the added cost of imposing liability themselves.90 
Therefore, states cannot rely on contracting over liability to pro-
duce optimal liability reform because patients would not optimally 
contract into reforms, such as entity liability, that produce collective 
benefits, even when they all would benefit from similar reforms im-
posed collectively through state action.91  Moreover, contracting is a 
costly way to produce reforms that should be widely adopted.  Thus, 
patients who would benefit from these reforms would be better off if 
the state imposed them by fiat. 
III.  INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTING  
OUT OF REFORMED LIABILITY 
Proponents of contractual liability also claim that any state that 
does reform malpractice liability can only benefit its citizens by allow-
ing them to contract out of these reforms with their individual provid-
ers.92  This Part evaluates this claim as applied to negotiable contract-
ing between patients and individual providers at the point of service.  
 
monitoring of physicians.  Cf. infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing empiri-
cal evidence that providers standardize care across patients). 
90 To the extent that hospitals standardize administrative systems and other safety 
measures, see infra note 96, then all hospital patients are governed by the same admin-
istrative systems and safety measures, whether they impose liability or not.  Given this, 
individual patients are better off not imposing liability because patients who impose 
liability must pay more for the same quality of care than patients who do not impose 
liability.  Patients would pay more if they imposed liability because hospitals would 
charge them for the expected cost to the hospital of the patients’ right to receive com-
pensation for injuries resulting from medical negligence.  But most patients do not 
want to pay for the right to obtain compensation through the tort system.  First, the 
amount they must pay for this right—which is based on the damages that providers 
must pay plus their litigation costs—exceeds its expected benefit, which is the damage 
award minus plaintiff-side litigation costs (and exclusive of those of the defendant).  In 
addition, patients can often obtain insurance against many losses resulting from medical 
negligence at lower cost by purchasing first-party insurance. See supra note 54 and ac-
companying text. 
91 The finding that the deterrence benefit of contractual liability is less than the 
deterrence benefit of state-imposed liability establishes that contractual liability is not 
an efficient reform mechanism even if patients also value the right to compensation.  
Patients only have efficient incentives to contract into liability if they can replicate the 
benefit of optimal state-imposed liability by contract.  This necessarily includes the de-
terrence benefits of liability.  Moreover, patients would be unlikely to value contractual 
liability solely as a mechanism for obtaining insurance against the risk of medical neg-
ligence because malpractice liability is not an effective mechanism for compensating 
patients.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra Section I.A.  
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It first evaluates whether patients who would have benefited from the 
effect of state-imposed liability on their individual physicians’ invest-
ments in safety would necessarily benefit from negotiating to impose 
liability through an individual contract.  It then assesses whether pro-
viders would price contractual liability optimally. 
This Part shows that individual contractual liability would violate 
each of these conditions.  Patients who value liability would get less 
benefit, at greater cost, from liability imposed by contract than from 
state-imposed liability.  Thus, states would hurt the patients who would 
benefit from state-imposed malpractice liability by permitting them to 
contract out of it and would create excessive incentives for patients to 
waive liability.93 
A.  Collective Goods and the Free-Rider Problem 
Patients obtain less deterrence benefit when they impose liability 
individually by contract than they do from liability imposed by the 
state because individual physician malpractice liability is a collective 
good, best regulated by collective liability.  As previously explained, a 
central purpose of malpractice liability is to induce providers to make 
cost-effective investments in patient safety.94  Many of these invest-
ments are not patient-specific, but instead affect the provider’s capaci-
ty to provide proper care to any and all of her patients.  These invest-
ments in collective care include investments in obtaining the expertise 
needed to correctly diagnose patients and select the right treatment, 
as well as pre- and postcontractual investments in health care technol-
ogy, staffing, and supervision.95  These investments benefit all of a pro-
 
93 See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also supra note 91 and accompany-
ing text.  This Article focuses on inefficiencies that arise from the structural differences 
between contractual and state-imposed malpractice liability.  In addition, patients will 
not have optimal incentives to contract into liability with individual providers if they 
are insured against some of the losses arising from medical error, since insurance re-
duces the ex post (post-insurance) cost to them of error.  See Geistfeld, supra note 70, 
at 830-31 (arguing that consumers will not contract efficiently over liability for product 
defects if they are insured against their losses, assuming that insurance premiums do 
not adjust to reflect the risk of the products that each consumer purchases); see also Jon 
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality:  An Economic Justifica-
tion for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 132, 148-53 (1990) (observing that 
first-party insurance can blunt potential victims’ incentives to invest in deterrence since 
insurers do not classify insureds according to the riskiness of their product purchases); 
see also discussion infra note 123. 
94 See supra Section I.A.  
95 Studies of medical error reveal that patients particularly benefit from liability 
when it induces medical providers to invest more in expertise, administrative systems, 
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vider’s patients because providers usually use their expertise, im-
proved administrative systems, and good health information 
ogy when treating all of their patients, not just a select few.96 
Recognition that core medical safety investments are collective 
goods reveals that malpractice liability is also a collective good.  Liabil-
ity is a collective good because each patient’s risk of being injured by 
her medical caregiver depends on that provider’s investments in col-
lective care, which in turn depend on the scope of that provider’s ex-
pected liability to all of her patients collectively, not just to one pa-
tient.  Thus, each patient’s expected safety depends not only on her 
own liability decisions, but also on the liability choices of others.97 
 
and health information technology pre- and postcontract, since deficient expertise and 
poor systems are leading causes of medical error. See supra text accompanying notes 30-
40 (discussing the causes of medical error). 
96 For example, once a physician develops expertise in a particular illness or 
treatment choice, she usually uses this expertise to benefit all affected patients.  She 
will not knowingly deny some patients the right to that expertise because they have not 
paid for premium care.  Similarly, physicians who develop administrative systems or 
surgical procedures to reduce error generally apply them to all relevant patients and 
do not limit them to a select few.  See Richard G. Frank & Richard Zeckhauser, Custom-
Made Versus Ready-to-Wear Treatments:  Behavioral Propensities in Physicians’ Choices, 26 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 1101, 1102 (2007) (finding that physicians tend to follow norms rather 
than customizing care for individual patients). 
 The claim that providers tend to standardize collective aspects of care—such as 
expertise, treatment assessments, and systems—even when patients have paid for care 
of differing quality—also is supported by evidence that the quality of care a patient 
receives from her physician depends not only on whether that patient herself has de-
cided to insure through an MCO (which will place pressure on the physician to reduce 
costs) but also on whether a high proportion of the physician’s other patients are in-
sured through an MCO.  Sherry Glied & Joshua G. Zivin, How Do Doctors Behave When 
Some (But Not All) of Their Patients Are in Managed Care?, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 337, 352-53 
(2002) (concluding that the quality of care a patient receives from her physician de-
pends not only on whether the patient is enrolled in an MCO but also on whether the 
physician’s other patients are predominately managed care patients); see also Paul A. 
Heidenreich et al., The Relation Between Managed Care Market Share and the Treatment of 
Elderly Fee-for-Service Patients with Myocardial Infarction, 112 AM. J. MED. 176, 179-80 
(2002) (providing evidence that a patient’s expected outcome from treatment by a 
particular physician depends on the portion of the patients enrolled in managed care 
in the local market and not just on that patient’s choice of insurer). 
97 See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 2003 (finding that contracting over liability 
to govern physician expertise is not efficient because expertise is a collective good).  The 
interdependence of patients’ liability choices is heightened by the fact that many impor-
tant medical care investments are “lumpy”—the provider faces a discrete choice between 
making a substantial investment in a particular type of care or no investment at all.  For 
example, a hospital seeking to protect patients by purchasing and implementing a physi-
cian-order-entry system (to computerize prescriptions) must incur the full cost of pur-
chasing the system, installing it, and implementing it.  It cannot purchase a marginal 
(one dollar) increment of the system.  Similarly, it is difficult for a hospital to change pol-
icies regarding supervision or patient hand-off procedures in marginal (one dollar) in-
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Because malpractice liability is a collective good, patients are bet-
ter off when they can impose liability collectively, as when the state 
imposes liability by fiat, because patients do not achieve the same de-
terrence benefits when they threaten to impose liability individually.  
Under state-imposed liability, each provider invests in all measures that 
are cost-effective in light of their effect on the provider’s expected lia-
bility to all of her patients.  By contrast, a patient imposing liability indi-
vidually only induces those investments that are cost-justified in light of 
their effect on the provider’s expected liability to her alone. 
Moreover, a patient contracting into liability only benefits from 
the marginal effect of her own liability on the provider’s care, even if 
other patients also impose liability.  Physicians tend to apply im-
provements in expertise, safety protocols, staff, and administrative sys-
tems to all their patients.  Thus, whether or not a particular patient 
imposes liability, her treating physician would give her the benefit of 
all collective care investments induced by other patients’ decisions to 
impose liability.  As a result, each patient may get little or no benefit 
from imposing liability individually by contract even when collectively 
all patients are much better off when liability is imposed. 
To see this, consider a provider serving many patients, each of 
whom would benefit from state-imposed malpractice liability because 
it would induce the provider to make a substantial investment in col-
lective care.  These individual patients could not replicate this benefit 
by contracting to impose liability individually.  Any patient who ex-
pects all other patients to waive liability would rationally waive it as 
well, because the provider will not make the needed substantial in-
vestment in collective care in response to the threat of liability to one 
patient.  In turn, any patient who expects others to impose liability still 
benefits from waiver if the threat of liability to others is sufficient to 
induce the provider to make all (or almost all) of the desired invest-
ments in collective care.  The patient could reap the benefit of these 
 
crements.  Hospitals generally need to change procedures in a uniform way across an en-
tire ward (and often the entire hospital), which entails a substantial expenditure.  See supra 
note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the standardization of health care practices).  
 The magnitude of the costs involved in the hospital reforms needed to protect pa-
tient welfare are sufficiently great that no one patient would impose enough expected 
liability to induce these expenditures because a provider’s expected liability to one pa-
tient is not particularly high.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  Liability only 
induces such investments if the physician faces liability to a sufficiently large number of 
patients to justify a substantial investment in error reduction.  
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investments at less cost98 by not imposing liability, whenever her physi-
cian applies the same expertise, administrative systems, protocols, and 
other collective care measures to all patients.99 
 
98 Patients waiving liability would lower their expected costs because providers 
would charge higher prices to patients imposing liability than to those who do not, 
even if the quality of care is the same, because providers serving liability-imposing pa-
tients must recapture the expected cost of the liability-imposing patients’ right to com-
pensation.  Given this, patients would benefit from waiving contractual liability, be-
cause the premium providers must charge in order to accept liability exceeds the 
compensation patients generally expect to receive.  Providers will charge a premium 
for liability that reflects their expected gross damage payments plus their expected de-
fense costs, whereas patients will receive compensation net of both their own litigation 
costs and defense-side costs.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining this 
point and noting that patients can more cheaply insure through first-party insurance 
than through liability); see also Weiler, supra note 47, at 926 (observing that “malprac-
tice litigation uses up approximately 55% to 60% of the claims dollar—not even count-
ing the business costs incurred by all forms of private insurance”).  
99 We can demonstrate this claim through the following example.  Assume that 
the state imposed optimal liability reform.  Assume there are 100 patients.  Assume 
that if liability is imposed for all patients, each physician would spend $3000 to adopt 
optimal care, which would reduce each patient’s risk of suffering a $1000 injury due to 
medical negligence from 1/10 to 1/100.  Assume litigation costs are $300 per claim.  
The total net social benefit of using liability to reduce the risk of error across all pa-
tients is [(1/10)(1000)—(1/100)(1000)]100—3000—(1/100)(300)(100) = 5700, 
which yields a benefit of $57 per patient. 
 
Table 2:  Expected Costs if Doctor Invests $3000 
 
Liability 
Waiver 
Cost of 
Care Per 
Patient 
Patient’s 
Expected 
Harm 
Net Expected 
Compensation 
Patient’s Expected Costs 
Yes 30 10 0 40 
No 30 10 10-3 = 7 
40 + (1/100)(1000— 
1000 + 300) = 43 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that each patient is better off when liability is imposed, 
each patient offered the right to contract out of liability will do so because she gains 
nothing from her individual decision to impose liability.  To see this, assume the pa-
tient believes that the other 99 patients will impose liability.  In this case, the threat of 
liability to these other patients is sufficient to induce the provider to invest $3000 in 
care.  This will lower the risk of injury to the remaining contracting patient to 1/100, 
whether or not she imposes liability.  Given this, the patient will waive liability because 
doing so enables her to obtain care at a lower cost.  If the patient imposes liability, the 
provider will charge her an extra $10 to reflect the providers’ expected payments to 
the patient.  Yet the patient only expects to receive $7 in expected compensation, be-
cause she must pay expected attorney’s fees of $3 (300(1/100) = 3).  By contrast, if a 
patient assumes that none of the others will impose liability, then she also will not be-
cause imposing expected liability on the physician of $100[(1/10)(1,000)] will not in-
duce the provider to invest $3000 in care.  Of course, if each patient reasons the same 
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Contracting over liability thus would encourage each patient act-
ing individually to waive liability in order to reduce her health care 
expenses because she can do so without substantially reducing ex-
pected outcomes.  Of course, if each patient makes the same rational 
decision, none of them will impose liability even when all of them 
would have been better off if they imposed liability collectively.100  
Thus, patients who would have benefited from the effect of state-
imposed liability on providers’ investments in collective care would be 
worse off under individual negotiable contractual liability because 
they would be unable to use contract to induce providers to make op-
timal investments in collective care. 
Moreover, this collective action problem exists even if we recog-
nize that patients are risk averse and want to insure against losses from 
medical error.  Patient risk aversion would not induce patients to opt 
into liability solely in order to get the right to compensation because 
even risk averse patients rarely derive a net benefit from the right to 
receive compensation for medical error through the tort system.  First, 
providers must charge patients much more for this right to compensa-
tion than patients can expect to receive.  Providers would price con-
tractual liability to reflect their own litigation costs as well as the gross 
value of damages paid, much of which would go to plaintiffs’ lawyers.  
Most patients facing liability with a load factor of about sixty percent 
would find that the cost of obtaining compensation through the tort 
system exceeds its benefit.  In addition, patients would not contract 
solely for the right to obtain compensation given that they can obtain 
broader and cheaper coverage for many of the monetary costs of all 
medical errors—and not just those resulting from provable medical 
negligence—by purchasing first-party disability insurance or medical 
insurance that includes long-term care.101  Thus, the quest for insur-
 
way, then they will all waive liability and the physician will not invest $3000 in care—to 
the detriment of every patient. 
100 See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 2003-04.  The free-rider problem is par-
ticularly great when liability is needed to induce providers to make substantial, dis-
crete, collective investments that cannot be undertaken incrementally, such as health 
care technology, improvements in administrative systems or support staff, and substan-
tial investments in expertise.  In this situation, each patient knows that her medical 
provider will make the investment only if she faces liability for a substantial number of 
her patients.  If she does face liability, she will make the investment regardless of what 
any particular patient does.  If she does not, she will not make it, regardless of what any 
one patient does.  Given this, each patient will rationally waive liability because she 
knows that her decision will have no effect on the provider’s expected investment in 
discrete care.  
101 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
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ance would not generate a sufficiently broad independent demand for 
medical malpractice liability to ensure that all patients who would 
have benefited from the effect of state-imposed liability on medical 
safety impose liability by contract. 
B.  The Inability to Induce Optimal Precontractual Care 
Patients who value liability also would be worse off under nego-
tiated contractual liability because it cannot be used to induce provid-
ers to make optimal precontractual investments in care, unlike state-
imposed liability.102  State-imposed malpractice liability can be used to 
induce providers to make durable investments in care precontract be-
cause providers anticipating liability to future patients benefit from mak-
ing durable investments in care that are economically justified in light of 
their benefit to future as well as current patients.  Thus, state-imposed 
malpractice liability benefits patients by inducing providers to invest in 
their safety precontract, prior to any patient-provider relationship. 
Proponents assert that patients obtain a similar benefit when they 
contract into liability, because contracting into liability enables them 
to select the providers who invested more in precontractual care.  As 
previously explained, this claim rests on the premise that high-quality 
providers can use negotiable contractual liability to signal their higher 
quality.103  This claim is incorrect as applied to negotiable contracting 
over liability because this form of liability is not a credible signal of 
precontractual quality.  
High-quality providers cannot use liability to signal quality because 
low-quality providers can mimic their liability contract offers without 
losing money.  First, low-quality providers can offer to bear liability for 
the same price as high-quality providers because physician malpractice 
liability is not experience-rated.  Thus, high-quality physicians cannot 
use a liability offer to signal quality because low-quality physicians can 
mimic their liability contracts, at the same cost, by purchasing liability 
 
102 Individual providers could not eliminate these inefficiencies by using standard 
form contracts because standard form contracting with individual providers would be 
plagued by a host of additional problems.  See infra Section IV.A & note 123 (discussing 
the numerous problems associated with standard form contracting between individual 
providers and patients at the point of service). 
103 See supra subsection I.C.2.  When signaling through voluntary liability enables 
consumers to distinguish high-quality providers from low-quality ones, then voluntary 
liability also provides medical caregivers with an incentive to become high quality by 
investing in precontractual quality.  See supra text accompanying note 62. 
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insurance at the same price as high-quality physicians.104  Informed pa-
tients, knowing this, would attach no signaling value to an offer to 
bear liability. 
Second, high-quality providers cannot use an offer to bear liability 
to signal quality when patients can negotiate with them at the moment 
of contracting.  Informed patients who receive this offer, and believe 
it is an accurate signal, would seek a liability waiver in return for a mu-
tually beneficial reduction in the contract price.  Patients would seek 
to waive liability—even when they value the quality ostensibly asso-
ciated with the signal—because the provider’s precontractual care is 
already fixed by the time the patient contracts with her.105  Thus, each 
patient can reduce her costs by waiving liability without affecting her 
provider’s expected precontractual care.  Accordingly, once the pro-
vider has offered to bear liability, a patient has no reason to accept it 
unless she wants to use liability to insure against the risk of error.106  As 
previously explained, however, an informed rational patient should 
not be willing to pay to insure through the tort system because the 
price providers must charge for liability (and defense costs) substan-
tially exceeds a patient’s expected net recovery after litigation costs.  
Also, patients can more cheaply insure against the risk of accidental 
harm through first-party insurance.107  Thus, an informed patient of-
 
104 In the classic signaling model, high-quality physicians are able to use liability to 
signal quality because their lower risk of error translates into lower expected liability 
costs.  Thus, they can offer to bear liability at a lower price than can low-quality physi-
cians.  This result does not hold if physicians obtain malpractice liability insurance 
which is not experience-rated, however, because now low- and high-quality physicians 
bear the same expected liability costs in the form of standardized premiums. 
105 Moreover, the patient’s expectation about the provider’s quality is also fixed—
the patient having obtained all available information about the provider’s quality from 
her offer to bear liability. 
106 The conventional result that contracting over liability will result in a “separat-
ing equilibrium” in which only high quality producers offer to bear liability—thereby 
signaling their superior quality— is based on a model in which producers make take-it-
or-leave-it liability offers.  In addition, in these models, consumers are risk averse and 
bear no costs if they enforce their right to compensation.  Given this, in these models, 
consumers value warranties both for the signal they provide about the producer and 
for the insurance against the risk of product defects, and thus they accept liability.  See 
Grossman, supra note 55, at 474-77 (showing that a monopolist will offer a full warran-
ty using a model in which consumers are risk averse and warranty offers are not rene-
gotiable); Spence, supra note 44, at 569-70 (showing that producers can use voluntary 
contracting over liability to signal quality when consumers are risk averse, injuries in-
volve purely monetary losses, and other conditions are met).  
107 See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 1, at 1369 (observing that the load burden on first-
party insurance is only 10 cents of every premium dollar whereas the load burden on 
malpractice liability insurance is 60 cents of every premium dollar); see also Richard A. 
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fered the right to impose liability that she believes signals the provider 
is high quality generally would seek the services of that provider but 
then immediately ask the provider to waive liability, for a mutually ac-
ceptable price reduction.108  A provider operating in a competitive 
market would accept this offer. 
Unfortunately, this results in a situation in which high-quality pro-
viders cannot use contractual liability to signal quality.  Low-quality 
providers can mimic the malpractice liability contracts of high-quality 
producers without bearing excessive liability costs, because they can 
be confident that most patients will seek a waiver.109  As a result, even 
 
Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 668-69 (1985) 
(arguing that products liability does not confer a net benefit when viewed purely as an 
insurance system). 
108 Consider two physicians negotiating over liability with a risk neutral patient:  a 
low-quality physician who has an error risk of 0.1 and a high-quality physician with an 
error risk of 0.01 as a result of unobservable precontractual investments that increased 
her marginal treatment costs by $30 per patient.  The patient suffers a $1000 loss if her 
physician errs.  Litigation costs are $300.  Assume low-quality care is costless. 
 The patient would prefer to be treated by the high-quality physician.  In return for 
$30 in additional cost, she obtains $90 in expected benefit, resulting from a reduction in 
her expected losses from (0.1)1000 to (0.01)1000.  This produces an expected net bene-
fit of $60—which translates into a net benefit of $57 if liability is used to signal quality.  
 
 Patient’s Expected Costs if She Believes Liability Signals Quality 
No Liability 30 + (0.01)(1000) = 40
Liability 40 + (0.01)(1000—1000 + 300)  = 43
 
 The high-quality provider cannot use liability to signal quality if the patient can 
negotiate for a waiver after selecting the physician because patients who believe the 
signal will negotiate to eliminate liability.  Once a patient has selected the physician, 
expected quality is fixed.  At this point, liability only operates as a mechanism for com-
pensating the patient.  Given this, each patient should ask the doctor to waive liability 
in return for a price reduction, because the amount the physician must charge her for 
the right to compensation ($10) exceeds her expected recovery, which is only $7 after 
litigation costs.  The patient could leave both parties better off by, for example, offer-
ing to waive liability in return for a price reduction of $9.  Ex post, the high-quality 
physician will accept this offer.  The expectation of renegotiation precludes the high-
quality physician from using liability to signal quality, however, because low-quality 
providers also will offer to bear liability, confident in the expectation that patients who 
select them believing the signal will ask to waive liability.   
109 Arlen, supra note 75.  Negotiation also undermines the use of contractual liabil-
ity to regulate the moral-hazard problem.  See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 19, at 2002-
03 (explaining how renegotiation undermines the ability of patients and physicians to 
use contractual liability to address moral hazard because providers know that patients 
have an incentive to waive after providers invest in care); Abraham L. Wickelgren, The 
Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
168, 170 (2006) (showing that contracting over products liability by homogenous con-
sumers is not efficient if consumers can waive liability after producers select product 
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where each patient would benefit if the state imposed liability by fiat 
in order to induce producers to invest optimally in precontractual 
care, patients contracting individually over liability nevertheless would 
waive it because they could not use negotiable contractual liability to 
replicate the effect of state-imposed liability on precontractual care.  
Accordingly, a patient who benefits from the incentives that state-
imposed liability gives providers to invest in precontractual care would 
not obtain the same benefit if required to negotiate liability with indi-
vidual providers. 
C.  Adverse Selection 
Contracting over liability also could hurt patients because provid-
ers would charge more for contractual liability than for equivalent lia-
bility imposed by the state, as a result of adverse selection.  This pre-
mium surcharge would create an inefficient incentive for patients to 
waive liability even when the expected benefit of liability exceeds the 
direct costs of imposing it. 
In a perfect world, patients would obtain liability whenever the 
expected benefit to them of liability equals or exceeds the expected 
cost to providers of bearing liability.  Patients would not get liability 
when the expected cost exceeds the expected benefit.  Contractual 
liability proponents claim that contracting by informed patients would 
lead to this desired outcome.  This claim rests on the premise that 
providers operating in competitive markets would price liability at its 
per-patient cost—this being the per-patient cost of the additional safe-
ty induced by liability plus the expected cost of each patient’s right to 
compensation.  Thus, patients would pay the same price for liability 
whether it is imposed by the state or by contract.110  This is not correct.  
 
quality); see also Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agen-
cy Contracts, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1279, 1280-81 (1990) (showing that principals cannot 
use incentive contracts to solve the moral hazard problem if they can renegotiate the 
contract after a risk-averse agent has invested in postcontractual effort because, once 
effort is fixed, both the principal and the risk-averse agent benefit from renegotiating 
the contract to eliminate the agent’s risk of being penalized for bad outcomes in re-
turn for the principal paying a lower salary). 
110 Some proponents of contractual liability recognize that state-imposed liability 
pools customers into a single insurance pool, a pooling that would be undone by con-
tractual liability.  Proponents assume, however, that using contractual liability to undo 
this pooling would necessarily increase consumers’ welfare.  See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 
6, at 40-44; Epstein, supra note 107, at 652.  Yet economists have shown that both low- 
and high-cost patients may be better off with pooling because pooling reduces the cost 
of obtaining the benefits of liability even to low-cost patients.  See generally Charles Wil-
son, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 167, 
ARLEN_FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2010  10:58 AM 
2010] Contracting over Liability 1001 
Providers would charge more for contractual liability than for state-
imposed liability and also more for liability than it would cost them to 
provide liability to the average liability-valuing patient. 
Providers would not set the price for liability equal to the ex-
pected cost of providing liability to each individual patient because 
the cost of offering liability to a patient depends on a variety of pa-
tient-specific factors that are unobservable (and noncontractable) at 
the moment of contract.  Patient-specific factors that can inflate the 
cost to a provider of bearing liability include preexisting conditions 
that increase the probability of a serious medical error111 and patient 
litigiousness.  Thus, providers do not know enough about the patient 
at the moment of contracting to set the price for liability equal to the 
actual expected cost of bearing liability to that patient.  Providers also 
face other obstacles to price discriminating in this way.  As a result, pa-
tients’ choices would not be optimal because imperfectly informed 
providers would undercharge some patients for liability and overcharge 
others relative to the costs they actually impose on the provider. 
Of course, providers also undercharge some patients and over-
charge others under state-imposed liability.  Accordingly, the issue 
arises whether contractual liability increases or reduces the cost of this 
problem for patients.  Evaluating this issue from the perspective of pa-
tients who value liability, these patients fare better when liability is im-
posed by the state.  Thus, it cannot be claimed that contracting over 
liability does not harm any patient. 
When liability is imposed by the state, each provider imposes a 
surcharge for liability based on the expected cost of the safety invest-
ments induced by liability plus her expected liability payment on aver-
age across all patients.  Providers would charge more to accept the 
same liability by contract, however, because the patients likely to pur-
chase a liability contract are more costly to them than are patients as a 
whole.  The problem is that patients do not simply differ in ways that 
affect providers’ costs.  These differences also affect the value to pa-
tients of imposing liability.  Patients get more benefit from liability 
(and the resulting increase in safety) if they expect to need a substan-
 
200-02 (1977) (showing that, when adverse selection is present, total social welfare may 
be higher when insurance is mandatory and pooled); infra Section IV.B (arguing that 
MCO contractual liability would be harmful to consumers because it would increase 
the adverse selection problem). 
111 Moreover, patients with complex conditions may impose additional costs on 
providers to the extent that treating them requires additional effort and resources for 
which the provider is not fully compensated by insurance. 
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tial amount of medical care or would face a significant risk of error if 
they do need care.  Thus, patients with multiple preexisting condi-
tions are more likely to value liability than are healthier patients be-
cause the former are more likely to be the victim of medical error and 
thus place a higher value on both the increased safety induced by lia-
bility as well as on the right to compensation.  Litigious patients are 
also more likely to elect to impose liability than are nonlitigious ones, 
all else equal, because they are more likely to use the right to sue for 
damages.  As a result, providers would charge more for contractual 
liability than for liability imposed by fiat because the expected cost of 
caring for (and bearing liability for injuries to) the average patient 
who values liability is higher than the expected cost of treating the av-
erage patient under state-imposed liability.112 
It might seem that this surcharge is optimal in that it would simply 
require expensive patients to bear their full costs.  This is not the case 
for two reasons.  First, although the average liability-valuing patient 
imposes higher costs on providers, others do not.  They simply place a 
high value on safety.  Some may not impose high litigation costs at all; 
they just value safety.  Yet these lower-cost patients also would have to 
pay a surcharge to obtain liability because providers cannot determine 
which patients are more costly.113  Contracting would thus force these 
patients either to (a) pay more to obtain liability than they would pay 
under state-imposed liability (and more than it would cost the provid-
er to deliver it to them) or (b) waive liability and receive lower-quality 
care than they want and are willing to pay for.114  Either choice would 
 
112 In other words, contracting over malpractice liability would be distorted by a 
problem economists call “adverse selection,” which can occur when the cost or benefit 
to one party to a market transaction depends on an unobservable characteristic of the 
other party.  George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490-91 (1970).  In this situation, contracts will 
deviate from optimality as a result of some people’s efforts to signal that they are a 
good type by bearing costs that other (less desirable) people would find too costly to 
bear.  See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Mar-
kets:  An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 648 (1976).  
For a useful survey of the literature on adverse selection, see Charles Wilson, Adverse 
Selection, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 63, at 25, 25-
31, and Joseph P. Newhouse, The Economics of Health Insurance, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 63, at 872, 872-75.  This Section only briefly 
discusses adverse selection.  Section IV.B discusses it more thoroughly.   
113 This is true so long as the expected cost of offering liability to the patients like-
ly to contract into it exceeds the average per-patient cost of offering liability to the 
population at large. 
114 Moreover, to the extent that lower-cost patients elect to waive liability, this 
would only increase the price charged for liability, leading more patients to waive lia-
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leave them less well off than they would be under state-imposed liabili-
ty, where the price for liability would be lower.115  Waivers would also 
be inefficient, resulting in patients eschewing liability even when the 
benefit to the patient of liability (and higher safety) exceeds its cost. 
D.  Summary 
The preceding analysis reveals that, contrary to proponents’ 
claims, allowing patients to contract over liability with individual phy-
sicians could hurt patients who value liability, even if they contract in 
their own best interest.  The reason is that contracting over liability 
alters the type of liability they can impose, forcing patients to substi-
tute a narrow form of liability—individual liability imposed on specific 
providers at the moment of contract—for broad, collectively imposed, 
multitemporal, multiprovider liability imposed by the state.  This is 
not a substitution that patients who value liability would make if given 
the choice, because contractual liability gives them lower deterrence 
benefits at greater cost.  Thus, rather than being choice- and welfare- 
enhancing, contractual liability precludes patients from using the 
form of liability likely to be most cost-effective, replacing it with the 
right to impose a far less valuable and more costly form of liability that 
cannot be used to effectively regulate precontractual and collective 
care.  As a result, the move to contractual liability would harm patients 
who could benefit from state-imposed liability and create inefficient 
incentives for patients to waive liability.  This mandated change in the 
structure of liability is one that many informed patients would reject if 
offered the choice. 
IV.  CONTRACTING WITH COMMITMENT THROUGH MCOS 
The conclusion that individual negotiable contractual liability is 
inefficient raises the question whether patients could obtain the bene-
fits of state-imposed malpractice liability at the same price through an 
alternative form of contractual liability.  In particular, the question 
arises whether it is possible to eliminate the inefficiencies plaguing 
individual negotiable contractual liability by channeling contracting 
 
bility even though the benefit to them of liability exceeds the cost to the provider of 
bearing it.   
115 See also infra text accompanying note 127 (discussing how pooling can redress 
an incompleteness in insurance markets that precludes healthy patients from purchas-
ing insurance today to protect against the risk of becoming ill in the future). 
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through collective contracts with liability terms fixed prior to the mo-
ment when the patient selects her provider. 
Leading contractual liability proponents favor just such a form of 
contractual liability.  They argue that states should shift all liability for 
medical error to MCOs and then permit MCOs to contract over (and 
out of) liability by offering their subscribers health insurance plans 
containing clauses governing the extent to which patients can sue 
MCOs for injuries resulting from medical negligence by either MCOs 
or medical providers.116  This contracting would take place when pa-
tients select their health insurance plans and thus would involve pa-
tients selecting between various nonnegotiable contracts affecting lia-
bility.  Proponents of MCO contracting tend to assume that informed 
patients would necessarily benefit from the option to contract over 
liability with their MCOs.117 
This Part evaluates the claim that informed patients would not be 
hurt by the adoption of contracting over liability with medical insur-
ers.  In order to evaluate MCO contracting in the most favorable light, 
this Part focuses on a form of MCO contractual liability designed to 
ameliorate the collective action and renegotiation problems plaguing 
negotiable contracting with individual providers.  Thus, it is assumed 
that health insurers would present subscribers with standard form non-
negotiable contracts.  To ensure that liability is imposed collectively and 
that any decision to waive is truly voluntary, it also is assumed that each 
patient selecting health insurance has a choice between at least two 
 
116 See infra note 123 and accompanying text (explaining why proponents favor MCO 
standard form contracting over standard form contracting with individual physicians). 
117 In considering contracting through medical entities, this Article focuses on 
contracting with MCOs because MCO contracting is superior to contracting with either 
hospitals or large physician groups because patients are better to coordinate care, fi-
nancing, and incentives across their various medical providers when they contract with 
MCOs than when contracting individually with hospitals or provider groups.  See, e.g., 
HAVIGHURST, supra note 6, at 171-73 (arguing that enterprise contractual liability im-
posed on MCOs is superior to hospital liability for medical error); Arlen & MacLeod, 
supra note 19, at 1995-96 n.221 (asserting that MCOs are the superior entities to bear 
entity-level liability); Danzon, supra note 1, at 1382 (concluding that contracting 
through managed care plans is superior to patient contracting with individual physi-
cians); Sherry Glied, Managed Care (hypothesizing that managed care plans may be 
able to effectively improve performance and information provisions), in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF HEALTH ECONOMICS supra note 1, at 707, 725 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. New-
house eds., 2000); Havighurst, supra note 6, at 8-9 (arguing in favor of MCO contrac-
tual liability); Sage, supra note 6, at 163-64 (concluding that MCO liability is superior 
to hospital liability for medical error).  But see Abraham & Weiler, supra note 19, at 393-
94 (arguing for enterprise liability for hospitals). 
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health insurance plans:118  one in which all medical providers in the 
network are subject to reformed malpractice liability to all of their pa-
tients, and the other in which no provider is subject to liability for med-
ical negligence to any patient.119  As before, it is assumed that patients 
know the costs and benefits of imposing liability by contract.120 
This Part shows that MCO contractual liability would reduce the 
collective goods and renegotiation problem that would plague indi-
vidual negotiable contractual liability.  Nevertheless, it is inferior to 
reformed state-imposed malpractice liability from the perspective of 
patients who value liability.  Patients who benefit from state-imposed 
liability are harmed by the right to contract with MCOs over liability 
because MCO contractual liability would be very costly, as a result of 
the adverse selection problem.  Indeed, channeling contracting 
 
118 But cf. Joseph P. Newhouse, Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers:  Effi-
ciency in Production Versus Selection, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1236, 1240 tbl.1 (1996) (ob-
serving that 48% of employees provided with insurance by their employers are only 
offered one health plan).   
119 This form of MCO liability differs from that preferred by proponents of MCO 
contracting who advocate unfettered contracting between MCOs and patients over lia-
bility.  This Section examines collective contracting with commitment because unfettered 
MCO contracting would be subject to the collective action and time-inconsistency prob-
lems identified in Part III.  To evaluate MCO liability in the most favorable light, this Ar-
ticle focuses on the form of MCO contracting that avoids these problems.   
120 Some have argued that MCO contracting ameliorates information problems 
because health insurance contracts are the product of negotiations between informed 
employers and insurers.  See, e.g., Epstein & Sykes, supra note 6, at 647-48.  There are 
two problems with this argument.  First, many employers, especially small employers, 
may not be fully informed about the benefits of an effective malpractice liability re-
gime.  Second, even if informed, employers will not use their superior information to 
select the liability provisions that maximize their employees’ welfare unless their em-
ployees also know the costs and benefits of liability.  When employees are uninformed, 
employers will select the clauses that their uninformed employees think benefit them, 
because these clauses will be valued on labor markets.  If employees care about price 
but underestimate the effect of liability on quality, employers will negotiate to reduce 
both quality and cost, even if the cost savings are less than the cost to the employees of 
the resulting reduction in the quality of care.  See Sherry A. Glied, The Employer-Based 
Health Insurance System:  Mistake or Cornerstone? (explaining that employers generally 
mimic the behavior of most workers when they select health plans, and thus place a lot 
of weight on price considerations and pay less attention to quality), in POLICY CHAL-
LENGES IN MODERN HEALTH CARE 37, 46-47 (David Mechanic et al. eds., 2005); see also 
David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Monopolistic Competition When Price and Quality 
Are Imperfectly Observable, 23 RAND J. ECON. 518, 519-26 (1992) (showing that competi-
tion in markets may lower consumer welfare in situations where consumers can easily 
compare producers’ prices but cannot easily assess quality differences; this will lead pro-
ducers to focus on lowering price even if it means lowering quality below optimal levels).  
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through MCOs would create a more serious adverse selection problem 
than would negotiable individual contractual liability.121 
MCO contractual liability is plagued by adverse selection because, 
all else being equal, the patients likely to contract into liability dispro-
portionately include those patients who expect to need serious medi-
cal care during the period of the insurance contract, in addition to 
those who are litigious.122  These patients do not just have higher ex-
pected liability costs.  Ill patients also are very costly for MCOs because 
MCOs are selling medical insurance, and thus would bear most of the 
financial burden of their higher medical costs. 
Accordingly, MCOs would not price liability plans efficiently, at 
the expected cost of offering liability to this particular patient (or 
even to the average patient).  Instead, they would charge an addition-
al premium to reflect the higher-than-average expected health care 
costs of the patients who impose liability.  This premium surcharge 
harms all relatively healthy patients who value liability by requiring 
them to pay a higher price for liability than is optimal.  They also 
would have to pay more than would be charged under state-imposed 
liability.  As a result, patients contracting over liability with their insur-
ers would face excessive incentives to waive liability.  Indeed, if the ad-
verse selection problem is great enough, contracting could result in 
all patients deciding to waive liability, even when all would have bene-
fited from state-imposed liability. 
A.  The Superiority of MCO Contractual Liability over Individual Contracting 
MCO contracting over liability through standard form contracts is 
superior to contracting over liability through individual negotiable 
contracts executed at the point of service for many reasons.123  Among 
 
121 Should individual providers publicly disclose their liability clauses (e.g., on the 
internet), the search-cost problem would be reduced, but only by introducing adverse 
selection.  Disclosure of providers’ liability clauses would exacerbate adverse selection 
because MCOs contracting with providers would design their insurance plans and con-
tracts based on an expectation that liability providers who offer their patients liability 
contracts will attract higher-cost patients.  MCOs would put liability-assuming providers 
into one insurance plan and no-liability providers into another, and price these plans 
accordingly. 
122 Indeed, to the extent that reformed malpractice liability operates effectively to 
induce hospitals to make systemic investments in care, the patients most likely to bene-
fit are those who expect to be hospitalized during the contract. 
123 MCO contracting over liability is superior to individual provider contracting 
liability for other reasons.  First, individual providers cannot easily give insured patients 
adequate financial incentives to waive liability because insured patients do not pay pro-
viders directly for the cost of the care they receive, and thus may not obtain the full 
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other benefits, MCO contractual liability can be designed to mute col-
lective goods problems and promote the use of liability to signal quali-
ty (by eliminating renegotiation).  It also is better able to facilitate 
coordination of care choices across medical providers. 
MCO contractual liability is less vulnerable to collective goods 
problems so long as MCOs allocate all liability-accepting providers to 
one plan and all no-liability providers to another.  Moreover, MCOs 
must require each provider to offer the same liability terms to all pa-
 
benefit of any price breaks offered by physicians.  MCOs, by contrast, can ensure that 
patients benefit when they waive liability by lowering the price for no-liability insur-
ance.  HAVIGHURST, supra note 6, at 171.  
 Standard form contracting over liability also is better accomplished through MCOs 
because individual-provider standard form contracting generally is rendered ineffi-
cient by imperfect information, search costs, and bounded rationality.  Individual phy-
sicians do not face adequate incentives to offer optimal liability terms when contract-
ing with patients seeking immediate medical care.  Even when patients would prefer 
and be willing to pay to retain liability, physicians can reduce costs by offering standard 
form contracts that include liability waivers.  Physicians offering such terms will not 
lose many patients because patients seeking medical care are unlikely to know the 
waiver clause exists, as almost no one reads standard form contracts.  See generally  
Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the  
Fine Print?  Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3  
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1199&context=nyu_lewp (providing 
evidence that only a small percentage of consumers read standard form contract terms); 
see also Danzon, supra note 1, at 1382 (noting that patients actively seeking medical care 
often are in no condition to consider properly the issue of contractual liability). 
 Moreover, those who do read their contracts often will continue to seek treat-
ment—even if the liability clause is welfare reducing—because it would be too costly 
for them to delay care in the hope of finding a provider with a contract they prefer.  
Patients seeking immediate necessary medical treatment are especially unlikely to 
search for a new provider because the cost of delaying care in the hope of finding a 
provider with better terms is likely to exceed the expected benefits.  Search costs are 
particularly high when patients cannot easily learn alternative providers’ liability claus-
es in advance or would face a delay in obtaining care from another provider.  The ex-
pected benefits of searching also may be low for patients whose choice of alternative pro-
viders is limited by their insurance or by the dearth of qualified providers in their 
geographic area. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Mar-
kets for Contract Terms:  The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 
1409-15 (1983). 
 MCO contractual liability is less afflicted by information problems and medical 
duress because MCOs would incorporate liability clauses into the health insurance 
contracts they present to their subscribers each year.  Patients normally enter into such 
contracts when they are not under medical duress.  Patients also usually have more 
time to deliberate over health insurance plans than over contracts presented to them 
by medical providers when they seek treatment.  Moreover, employers and unions of-
ten bring important clauses to their employees’ attention during the open-enrollment 
process.  See Danzon, supra note 1, at 1382; see also HAVIGHURST, supra note 6 at 171; 
Havighurst, supra note 6, at 16.  
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tients, including patients insured by others insurers.124  If MCOs were 
required to satisfy these conditions, then MCO contractual liability 
would reduce collective goods problems because each patient who 
imposes liability would automatically receive the benefit of liability 
imposed by others.  Moreover, patients could no longer free-ride on 
the liability choices of others because no patient could obtain the 
benefit of the incentives created by others’ decisions to impose liabili-
ty without electing to impose and pay for liability herself. 
In addition, MCO contracting with patients through standard 
form nonnegotiable contracts would enable high-quality providers to 
use liability to signal quality because patients contracting for the ser-
vices of a provider who offers to bear liability could not negotiate to 
waive it.  Thus, low-quality providers would be unable to mimic the 
liability contracts of high-quality providers in the hope that patients 
will waive liability because once a provider has joined a liability net-
work she is not permitted to accept waivers. 
Finally, MCO contracting has the advantage of facilitating net-
works of providers offering similar liability terms.  Networks are im-
portant because a provider’s personal liability choice has external ef-
fects on other providers delivering care to the same patients for 
similar or related conditions.  MCO contracting would facilitate the 
formation of all-liability and no-liability networks. 
Although MCO contracting reduces the collective goods problem, 
it would not remedy it entirely.  First, MCO contractual liability would 
only reduce the collective goods problem if contracting were con-
strained.  Specifically, each physician contracting over liability must be 
required to accept the same liability terms to govern all relationships 
with all patients and with all MCOs.  Absent this condition, MCOs 
(and thus patients) would not consider the effect of their decisions on 
the patients of other insurers.  Moreover, they would have incentives 
to free-ride by signing no-liability contracts with providers who are 
subject to liability to other MCOs’ patients.  Yet imposing this condi-
tion substantially reduces the heterogeneity benefits of contracting. 
Second, MCO contractual liability would not reach the millions of 
patients who are uninsured.125  These patients would create a free-
 
124 In other words, MCOs would need to insist that any provider who contracts to 
assume liability for its subscribers is also subject to liability to the subscribers of other 
insurers.  
125 Most privately insured patients are insured through an entity that operates as 
an MCO.  Nevertheless, in considering the costs and benefits of MCO contractual lia-
bility, it is important to recognize that more than 17% of the nonelderly population 
ARLEN_FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2010  10:58 AM 
2010] Contracting over Liability 1009 
rider problem if permitted to seek services from providers who contract 
for liability with MCOs without also imposing liability.  Yet, requiring 
uninsured patients to impose liability on any provider who has entered 
into liability contracts with an MCO would result in a situation where 
insured patients make choices that in effect bind the least well-off pa-
tients, who do not have insurance.  This would result in uninsured pa-
tients bearing the full adverse selection price penalty of contractual lia-
bility without getting the benefit of the right to contract out of liability. 
Finally, there exists a concern that because MCO contracting must 
be constrained, MCOs may converge on liability clauses that do not 
benefit most of their patients.  When providers must offer the same 
liability terms in all their contracts, they may base their liability clauses 
on the preferences of the largest MCO or largest employer.  This 
could result in a situation where liability choices are dictated by the 
preferences of a few large employers with sufficient market power to 
induce MCOs to offer health care plans tailored to their needs.  While 
some employees would obtain more choice than under state-imposed 
liability, others effectively would have their liability clauses dictated by 
entities that, unlike the state, do not even have an ostensible desire to 
look out for their interests.126 
B.  MCO Contractual Liability Increases Adverse Selection 
Beyond this, MCO contractual liability would harm many patients 
by substantially exacerbating the adverse selection problem plaguing 
health insurance markets.  The adverse selection problem presented 
by MCO contracting would be worse than that presented by negotia-
ble contracting over liability with individual providers. 
 
(under age sixty-five), and 15% of the entire U.S. population (including the elderly) 
are uninsured.  Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Unin-
sured:  Analysis of the March 2009 Current Population Survey, 344 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 1, 4 
(2009), available at www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_13_9_2009_No334_HI_Cvg1.pdf 
(providing insurance figures for 2008).  In states such as Florida, Texas and New Mex-
ico, more than 20% of the population is uninsured.  The Federalist Prescription, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 13, 2007, at 28.  Beyond this, more than 19% of the nonelderly population 
and 29% of the total U.S. population (including the elderly) are covered by public in-
surance.  Fronstin, supra, at 4.    
126 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corpo-
rate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV 713, 729-35 (1997) (dis-
cussing how learning and network externalities can lead contracting parties to adopt 
contracts with inefficient terms).  See generally Lewis Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscio-
nability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV 1151, 1183 (1976) (discussing inefficiencies 
plaguing standard form contracting).  
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Contracting over liability is not optimal unless patients can obtain 
liability by paying no more than the amount it costs the provider to 
offer liability, this being the cost of the investments in quality induced 
by liability plus expected liability costs.  MCO contractual liability vi-
olates this condition because competitive market pressures would in-
duce MCOs to charge more for liability than it costs to provide it.  
MCOs would charge an excessive premium for liability plans to reflect 
the higher-than-average expected health care expenditures of the type 
of patients who are disproportionately likely to select plans that offer 
liability.  This excessive surcharge would hurt patients who value liabil-
ity, inducing many to waive liability even if they would have benefited 
from liability imposed through the tort system.127 
MCOs would have to impose a surcharge on liability plans to re-
flect the higher demand for health care under liability plans as a re-
sult of selection effects.  A central goal (and effect) of malpractice lia-
bility is to induce medical providers to invest more in expertise and 
care.  These safety investments disproportionately benefit patients 
 
127 Proponents of contractual liability recognize that insurance markets are af-
fected by adverse selection but incorrectly assume that selection effects unambiguously 
favor contractual liability.  They assume contractual liability is better because mandato-
ry liability in effect requires all patients to purchase the same liability at the same price, 
thereby requiring low-risk patients to subsidize high-risk ones.  See, e.g., RUBIN, supra 
note 6, at 40-44 (describing the adverse selection problem and concluding that “elimi-
nation of the forced transfer from the tort system would conform with general notions 
of fairness [and would be] efficient”); Epstein, supra note 107, at 660 (“If the skillful 
and the incompetent, the watchful and the careless must be treated as falling within a 
single risk classification, then the former must subsidize the latter.”).  
 Yet economic analysis has shown that patients do not necessarily benefit from ef-
forts to reduce pooling.  Indeed, low-risk patients who value liability may well be better 
off when the state imposes liability (thereby pooling them with higher-cost patients 
whom they must cross-subsidize).  This is because if liability is not mandatory then 
these patients could not obtain liability without actively seeking it and would thereby 
join a pool that is disproportionately composed of high-cost patients.  The cost to low-
risk patients of obtaining liability voluntarily thus would be much higher than the cost 
to them of obtaining liability imposed by the state.  Thus, low-risk patients who want to 
impose liability benefit from pooling because they can purchase the insurance they 
desire more cheaply under pooled liability than they can under contractual liability.  
See generally Wilson, supra note 110, at 173-76 (showing that purchasers of health insur-
ance may be better off when required to purchase pooled insurance because low-risk 
insurers may be better off subsidizing high-risk ones, as they would have to with man-
datory insurance, than they would be under voluntary insurance, because adverse se-
lection is likely to lead them to be underinsured).   
 Moreover, even low-risk patients who do not benefit from liability in the short run 
may be better off when liability is mandatory if they benefit over the long run from the 
right to obtain lower-cost liability protection later when they are ill and need it.  See 
infra note 129 and accompanying text.  
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who expect to need medical care during the course of the contract.  
Informed patients who need serious or extended hospital care would 
particularly value liability, since hospitals appear to be a particularly 
significant source of medical error.  Accordingly, a disproportionate 
percentage of patients attracted to liability plans would be expensive 
for the MCO to insure.  Recognizing this, MCOs would price liability 
plans accordingly, based on both the cost of liability and the higher 
average health care costs of the type of patients who value liability.  As 
a result, an average patient seeking to obtain liability could only do so 
by paying a surcharge for health care she does not expect to need.  
This surcharge would require patients contracting into liability to pay 
more than they would have to pay for state-imposed liability.  Thus, 
average- and low-cost patients who contract into liability would have to 
bear a greater portion of the high-cost patients’ extra health care ex-
penses than they would have to bear under state-imposed liability.  
This premium surcharge is inefficient and would push many patients 
who value liability into no-liability plans, leaving them less well-off 
than they would be under state-imposed liability. 
To see why MCOs would distort pricing in this way, it is useful to 
examine in more detail the structure of health insurance pricing and 
the strong pressures that MCOs face to design plans to separate ill pa-
tients from healthy ones. 
1.  Structure of Health Insurance Pricing and Benefits of Pooling 
MCOs selling a given health plan to subscribers generally cannot 
legally charge individual patients different premiums based on their 
health differences, even when insurers have this information and 
know that these differences affect expected health care costs.128 
 
128 Insurers are allowed to charge a different amount to insure an individual or a 
family but often are precluded from adjusting premiums to reflect differences in sub-
scribers’ health status.  Of particular importance, federal law precludes group health 
insurers from charging individuals different premiums based on their health status.  
Group insurers also cannot exclude subscribers based on health status.  See Mary Cross-
ley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 113-16 
(2005) (discussing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s nondi-
scrimination provisions).  Some states have gone even further, requiring insurers to 
charge the same premium for a given benefit package to all subscribers within a given 
geographic location, even if the different subscriber pools have different risk characte-
ristics.  See id. at 112 (describing the “community rating” systems some states have em-
ployed).  Issuers are allowed to charge different premiums for different plans, however 
and can take the expected average health status of expected subscribers into account 
when setting these premiums.  
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State and federal regulations limit MCOs’ ability to price discri-
minate within a plan largely because legislatures recognize that insur-
ance cannot reliably guarantee coverage for ill patients unless ill pa-
tients are pooled in a plan with large numbers of healthy patients.  The 
reason for this is simple:  absent pooling, insurance companies would 
price health insurance to reflect each patient’s expected annual health 
care costs, but many, if not most, seriously ill patients cannot afford to 
pay their expected health care costs for the year.  Accordingly, in order 
to enable the seriously ill to get health insurance, government regula-
tion encourages insurance that pools ill and healthy patients together 
into a single plan with a uniform price.  Our current system of tax-
subsidized, employer-based health insurance helps to induce pooling. 
This pooling of healthy and ill patients might appear to harm 
healthy patients.  Yet, in fact they often benefit from it.  First, relatively 
healthy patients often benefit from pooling in the short run because it 
enables them to obtain high-quality insurance at a lower price than 
they could get otherwise, as will be explained.  In addition, people can 
benefit from pooling over the long run because pooling effectively 
enables them to insure against the risk of being sick in the future.  
Many, if not most, patients who are healthy today are likely to become 
seriously ill in the future and need more medical care than most pa-
tients can afford.  Absent pooling, each healthy patient would face a 
risk that she will eventually become a seriously ill patient unable to af-
ford medical insurance or medical care.  Patients would like to insure 
against this risk of becoming ill in the future but cannot do so directly 
because health insurance markets involve annual contracting.  Pooled 
employer-based insurance offers a partial solution to this problem by 
combining high- and low-cost employees into a single insurance pool 
to which an employee is entitled to belong so long as she remains with 
that employer.  Thus, while low-cost healthy patients do cross-
subsidize ill patients in the short run, they benefit from this system in 
the long run because it enables them to obtain cross-subsidized insur-
ance should they become sick in the future.  Thus, pooling benefits 
healthy patients by operating as a substitute for the ability to purchase 
insurance for future illnesses.129 
 
129 See Glied, supra note 120, at 41 (arguing that job-based insurance coverage 
through large firms offers a form of long-term private health coverage against future risk). 
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2.  Price-Distorting Effects of Adverse Selection 
Although pooling potentially benefits ill and healthy patients 
alike, MCOs operating in competitive markets face strong market 
pressures to break out of the pooling equilibrium by finding ways to 
separate low-risk from high-risk subscribers.  MCOs stand to gain from 
segmenting the market because patients vary enormously in their de-
mand for health care.  Ninety percent of the population spends rela-
tively little on health care, while ten percent of the population ac-
counts for nearly three-quarters of all medical spending.130  Indeed, 
the top one percent of health care users account for thirty percent of 
all medical spending.131 
Because MCOs are not allowed to directly discriminate against ill 
patients, they regularly seek other mechanisms to separate healthy 
from ill subscribers.  For example, many MCOs seek to attract healthy 
patients by designing plans that limit coverage in ways that deter un-
healthy patients from selecting the plan.  The MCOs’ goal is to design 
a plan that would be acceptable to healthy people (albeit one offering 
lower quality than healthy people would otherwise want) but unac-
ceptable to those with serious health care needs.  It is true that insur-
ers also offer high-quality plans.  But they charge very high premiums 
for them to the extent their selection efforts are effective, on the as-
sumption that these plans will disproportionately attract high-cost sub-
scribers.132  These premiums are sufficiently large that they tend to 
drive relatively healthy patients to lower-quality plans than they would 
prefer.  These inflated premiums would be particularly likely to in-
duce low- and middle-class patients to select plans offering lower-
quality care than they would prefer.   
MCOs’ efforts to segment the market can hurt both high- and low-
risk patients.  Most obviously, high-risk patients are hurt by efforts to 
segment the market because many can only afford adequate insurance 
if they are part of a pool dominated by healthy subscribers.  Thus, they 
may be forced to select the low-quality plan designed for healthy sub-
scribers.  Low-risk patients also can be hurt because MCOs’ efforts to 
segment the market are likely to cause them to purchase lower quality 
insurance and care than they would prefer (and be willing to pay for).  
 
130 David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 563, 572. 
131 Id. at 571-72. 
132 See Newhouse, supra note 118, at 1253-56 (discussing evidence that MCOs use 
plan design to select for healthier patients). 
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MCOs can only create a low-cost plan that does not appeal to high-risk 
patients by designing the low-cost plan to provide substantially lower-
quality care than the high-cost patients want.  These plans also are 
lower quality than most low-cost patients want, however.  MCOs never-
theless attract lower-cost patients to these plans because MCOs charge 
a substantial premium for high-quality plans (since these plans attract 
high-cost subscribers).  This adverse selection surcharge discourages 
low- and middle-class healthier patients from obtaining the quality of 
care they prefer.133  Thus, insurers’ efforts to segment the market 
present all patients with the unhappy choice between low-cost insur-
ance that gives them much lower-quality insurance than many would 
prefer, and higher-quality insurance at a price that far exceeds the 
amount they would have to pay for the same insurance in a pooled 
market.  Moreover, as previously explained, market segmentation also 
harms lower-risk patients over the long run by precluding them from 
using pooled insurance to, in effect, obtain lower-cost insurance 
against the risk of becoming ill in the future.134 
These costs of separation in markets plagued by adverse selection 
are sufficiently severe that governments not only regulate insurance 
prices, but also have long regulated the terms of insurance contracts 
in an effort to preclude insurers from offering excessively low-quality 
plans in order to segment the market.135  These interventions mute se-
 
133  For example, one study of family health policies found that a patient seeking 
to switch from a low-quality plan (charging a premium at the bottom tenth percentile 
of the premium distribution) to a plan offering no more than a 40% increase in health 
benefits (as measured by spending) would have to incur a three-fold increase in pre-
mium costs for this relatively small increase in coverage.  This three-fold increase in 
costs to obtain a mere 40% increase in coverage reflects the fact that the better plan 
attracts a disproportionate percentage of patients who need medical care.  Thus, the 
patients attracted to this plan have higher expected average costs than the patients in-
sured by the low-quality plan.  Id. at 1253-55.   
 The Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan also appears to exhibit a pricing 
structure distorted by selection effect.  Id. at 1255.  This plan offered two noninte-
grated plans with a free choice of physicians, known as the high- and low-option plans.  
Id.  The plans differed only in the amount of cost sharing, not in the coverage pro-
vided.  Id.  Although the actuarial difference in the two plans was only 10%, the price 
charged for the high-option plan was almost double that charged for the low-option 
plan, as a result of the expectation that this plan would attract people with greater 
health care needs.  Id.  
134 See supra text accompanying note 129. 
135 For example, largely to combat adverse selection, states impose certain mini-
mum-quality constraints on the coverage that plans can offer, such as requiring cover-
age of certain medical procedures.  See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care 
“Patient Protection” Laws:  Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 60-62 (1999) (contending that market forces will not induce MCOs 
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lection but also leave MCOs with an unfulfilled demand for mechan-
isms that promote selection.  This unfulfilled demand has implica-
tions for MCO contracting over liability. 
3.  Adverse Selection Under MCO Contractual Liability 
States’ efforts to reduce adverse selection would be seriously com-
promised by the introduction of MCO contractual liability.  MCO con-
tracting over liability raises selection problems because the primary 
effect of a well-designed liability system is to induce investments in ex-
pertise and systemic care, especially by medical entities such as hospit-
als.  These investments disproportionately benefit patients who need 
medical care over the term of the contract, especially those who ex-
pect to need serious hospital care.  Thus, liability plans would attract a 
disproportionate number of patients who expect to need serious (i.e., 
expensive) hospital care. 
Contracting over liability would exacerbate adverse selection by 
providing insurers with an additional unregulated distinction in plan 
quality that they could use, in combination with other differences, to 
segment patients based on cost.  Contracting over liability would help 
insurers segment the market because informed patients obtain more 
benefit from liability—and thus are more likely to demand it—if they 
have a higher-than-average demand for medical care.  Patients who 
are ill also may value liability more because they have a higher-than-
average risk of being injured by medical error if they obtain care, 
since patients who suffer from multiple conditions are more likely to 
be injured seriously if an error occurs.  These patients, if informed, 
would disproportionately seek policies offering liability.136 
Contracting over liability thus would present MCOs with a new 
opportunity to use plan design to segment the market.  Recognizing 
high-risk patients’ greater demand for liability, MCOs would use plan 
design to push high-risk patients into liability plans and low-risk pa-
tients into no-liability plans.137  To ensure that only low-risk patients 
 
to offer optimal coverage because MCOs know they can profitably restrict coverage for 
certain diseases because healthy consumers are unlikely to notice the restriction since 
they rarely read health plan coverage provisions carefully, and MCOs can profit from 
discouraging subscription by unhealthy, sophisticated consumers who do read plan 
terms and also are expensive to serve). 
136 See supra Section III.C. 
137 Patients who anticipate being healthy might want liability but could live without 
it in return for a sufficiently large discount.  By contrast, patients who need serious 
care would find the no liability plans unattractive.  Consequently, MCOs would use 
their right to contract over liability to help them segment the market. 
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purchase no-liability plans, MCOs would likely incorporate no-liability 
clauses into plans that restrict coverage and quality in ways that are ac-
ceptable (albeit not preferred by) low-risk patients but are completely 
unacceptable to high-cost patients.  In turn, liability clauses would 
likely only be included in expensive, high-quality, high-quantity health 
plans that disproportionately attract unhealthy patients.138 
As a consequence, patients would not have optimal incentives to 
contract into MCO liability because they could only obtain liability by 
paying an additional premium surcharge to reflect the higher ex-
pected health care costs of the high-cost patients disproportionately 
drawn to the higher-quality liability plan.139  This obviously could hurt 
high-cost patients.  But it could also hurt low-cost patients who bene-
fited from state-imposed liability.  These patients either would have to 
pay much more for liability than they would have under state-imposed 
liability or would have to accept a health plan that offers them substan-
tially lower-quality care than they would prefer.140  Moreover, MCO con-
tractual liability would undermine their ability to use pooled insurance 
against the risk of becoming seriously ill in the future.  Thus, many 
healthier patients would be worse off than under state-imposed liability. 
 
138 See Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 130, at 607 (“Generally, the sick are drawn 
to more generous plans than the healthy.”).    
139 It might appear that the adverse selection problem is muted by risk averse pa-
tients, who are likely both to disproportionately prefer liability and to be healthier on 
average.  Yet, contrary to this expectation, empirical analysis reveals that risk averse 
people impose lower costs on life insurers but do not impose sufficiently lower costs on 
acute health insurers to counteract the exponentially higher cost of insuring the un-
healthy people who value this insurance.  Thus, adverse selection seriously plagues the 
market for acute health insurance.  See David M. Cutler et al., Preference Heterogeneity and 
Insurance Markets:  Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 157, 161 (2008) 
(“For acute health insurance, the lack of any systematic offsetting effect of risk toler-
ance may explain why . . . this market is, on net, adversely selected.”). 
 Similarly, it might seem that insurers would be less inclined to penalize liability 
subscribers since liability deters errors that increase medical expenses.   But this effect 
will not seriously mute the adverse selection problem if the increased medical costs 
associated with the patients who prefer liability exceeds the cost savings to the MCO as-
sociated with any resulting reduction in medical error.  This is likely since MCOs pay 
all the added health care costs of the very ill patients who value liability and these costs 
are exponentially higher for the very ill.  By contrast, MCOs only bear higher medical 
costs as a result of error for the smaller portion of patients injured by error, and then 
only when the error harms the patient without killing her immediately.  Thus, the per-
patient adverse selection effect on plans that attract the ill can be expected to dwarf 
the per-patient deterrence benefits from liability.  
140 See generally Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 130, at 606-24 (discussing the effect 
of adverse selection on the health insurance choices of higher- and lower-risk patients).   
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In the extreme case, MCO efforts to select patients through plan 
design could lead to a premium death spiral under which all MCOs 
offer only lower-quality (no liability) plans, even when most patients 
prefer higher-quality plans (with liability).  Selection can lead to a 
premium “death spiral” if (1) a large percentage of healthy patients 
select the low-cost plan, and (2) the expected health costs of the pa-
tients who want the high-quality plan exceed the ability to pay of many 
of them, especially those with lower costs.  In this case, some of the 
sick patients with lower medical needs (and lower costs) may decide to 
select a no-liability plan.  But the decision of these patients to exit the 
liability plan would only increase the selection pressure on the higher-
quality liability plan, producing an additional price increase.  This 
price increase would induce even more patients to select the low-
quality plan.  This can lead to a situation where all patients pool in the 
lower-quality plan, even though most of them prefer the higher-
quality plan.  Should this happen, the lower-quality plan would in-
crease in price until it no longer offers a significant price savings.  Se-
lection effects can lead even relatively ill patients to select no-liability 
plans if selection pressures drive too many healthy patients from the 
higher-cost plans.141 
Thus, patients who value liability can be hurt by the right to con-
tract with MCOs over liability, because patients who would be willing 
to pay the social cost of the liability they impose would not necessarily 
be able to obtain liability by contract.  They either would have to pay 
an enormous premium surcharge for liability or select a low-cost no-
liability plan that offers them lower-quality care than they would pre-
fer.  Those patients who do contract into liability likely would pay far 
more for it than they would if the state imposed liability by fiat. 
V.  CONTRACTING INTO EXCESSIVE VARIATION IN STANDARDS OF CARE 
The preceding arguments against permitting contractual liability 
waivers raise the following question:  could states avoid the worst prob-
lems associated with contracting, while retaining its ostensible bene-
fits, by allowing limited contracting that allows patients to contract 
over the standard of care but does not allow them to waive liability?  
This form of contracting would, it has been suggested, allow patients 
to contract for the standard of care that reflects their willingness to 
 
141 See id. at 616 (“The disappearance of generous plans as a result of dynamic 
processes of adverse selection is termed a ‘death spiral.’”); Newhouse, supra note 118, at 
1255 (explaining that limits on insurance pooling can lead to a “premium death spiral”).    
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pay for safety.142  According to proponents, each patient would con-
tract for the level of care that maximizes her welfare, thereby produc-
ing the socially optimal degree of variation in the standard of care.143 
This Part considers the claim that patients should be permitted to 
contract over the standard of care because this would produce optim-
al variation in the standard of care.144  It shows that this claim is incor-
rect.  Individual contracting would create more variation in the stan-
dard of care than is socially optimal—and than is optimal for patients 
collectively—because parties engaged in atomistic contracting will not 
adequately take into account the cost savings to other patients and 
providers resulting from standardizing care standards and treatment 
protocols.  The decision of what degree of variation to permit is likely 
best left to an entity capable of balancing the benefit of individualiz-
ing against its social costs (e.g., the state). 
A.  Learning and Network Externalities of Varying the Standard of Care 
Proponents of contractual liability assume that contracting will 
yield the optimal variation in the standard of care because they as-
sume that each patient fully internalizes the costs and benefits of her 
decision concerning the standard of care.145  In other words, they im-
 
142 Contracting over the standard of care would permit patients to agree that doc-
tors should treat them less intensively than other patients.  One way patients could do 
this is to agree that a physician would provide only cost-effective treatments (and not 
provide some effective but excessively expensive treatments).  Moreover, patients could 
agree that in determining whether a treatment is appropriate—in the sense of cost-
effective—the evaluation could be made using a value of life that is lower than the val-
uation used for other patients.  
143 See Epstein, Contractual Principle, supra note 5, at 509 (describing the bargaining 
that would take place if patients could negotiate their standard of care). 
144 This Part focuses on the claim that contracting would produce optimal varia-
tion in the standard of care because Part III reveals that patients would not use their 
right to contract to select the level of care that maximizes their welfare.  Patients would 
not have optimal incentives to contract over the level of care provided because collective 
goods and renegotiation problems would preclude them from obtaining the full deter-
rence benefit of any standard of care imposed by contract.  In addition, they would be 
overcharged for contracting into higher quality of care as a result of adverse selection.  
Thus, for the reasons given in the preceding Part, contracting would not provide patients 
with optimal incentives to contract into the care levels that benefit them. 
145 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 5, at 182-83 (suggesting that, because patients bear 
the costs of medical care and obtain its benefits, from an efficiency perspective contrac-
tual arrangements would allow the parties to establish the rules that they prefer). 
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plicitly assume that each patient’s decision about her standard of care 
does not affect other patients.146 
Yet if we consider how physicians are trained and how they prac-
tice, it becomes clear that this is not the case.  Physicians’ capacity to 
provide care is affected by a complex interdependent network of rela-
tionships involved in the training of doctors, the provision of care, 
and the assessment of treatment protocols.  As a result, providers ob-
tain external learning, coordination, and network benefits when they 
aspire to a commonly agreed upon standard of care.  Thus, the cost to 
providers of delivering health care is lower when they aim to provide 
the same standard of care than when the standard of care varies signif-
icantly across providers.   
Most obviously, providers are able to gain expertise at lower cost 
when they can rely on the training they receive in medical school and 
at teaching hospitals to inform them how to respond to particular pa-
tient conditions.  This expertise is the same when treatment protocols 
are the same for all similarly situated patients and do not depend on 
patients’ contract terms.  Moreover, when providers are at least aim-
ing for similar goals, nonteaching hospitals can rely on teaching hos-
pitals to train young physicians, confident that successful training will 
produce a doctor who is aiming to deliver the quality of care the hospit-
al is obligated to provide.  By contrast, when the standard of care is de-
termined by contract, physicians trained in hospitals whose patients 
contracted to receive minimal care would be taught significantly differ-
ent treatment protocols from those trained in hospitals whose patients 
contracted for the highest possible care.  This lack of standardization 
would require nonteaching hospitals to either retrain physicians or spe-
cify the hospitals in which they should do their internships. 
Physician expertise also is less expensive when providers aim at a 
common standard of care because providers are better able to rely on 
research on best medical practices when they share common goals.  At 
present, medical researchers can conduct research on best practices 
to the benefit of doctors nationwide because there is considerable 
agreement about the desired goal of medical treatment.  The medical 
profession could not as easily develop best medical practices if physi-
cians in different hospitals were governed by dramatically different 
standards of care—resulting, for example, from differences in the wil-
lingness-to-pay valuation used to determine whether a treatment is 
 
146 See id. at 194 (arguing that informed patients would employ contract to de-
mand the level of care that is optimal for them). 
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cost-effective.  Thus, variation in the standard of care would increase 
the cost of physician expertise. 
Medical care would also be more expensive to provide—and po-
tentially more prone to error—if standards of care were to vary sub-
stantially across providers, because medical care requires considerable 
coordination across different providers, often operating out of differ-
ent practices.147  Providers can better coordinate their medical deci-
sions when they are governed by a common standard of care.  No-
where is this more evident than in the hospital context.  To control 
error, hospitals need to train nurses, aides, interns, and residents to 
follow standard protocols so that they can make quick, accurate, and 
automatic decisions in time-sensitive situations.  Individualized stan-
dards of care would increase hospitals’ costs of ensuring that their 
staff can promptly and effectively coordinate their actions to serve pa-
tients if these differences in standards result in protocols that differ 
across patients.  Similarly, individual contracting would increase the 
care costs of surgeons and other physicians who are associated with 
more than one hospital.  Without contracting, these providers can de-
liver care more effectively under the assumption that each of them, in 
the hospitals they serve, is aiming at a common standard.  Allowing 
each physician in the hospital to contract for her privately preferred 
standard of care would undermine this system.148 
B. Will Patients Contract for Optimal Variation? 
Patients contracting over the standard of care will seek more indi-
vidualization of the standard of care than is optimal.  This is because 
each individual patient obtains the full benefit of her decision to seek 
the standard of care that matches her willingness to pay for safety but 
does not bear the full cost of the resulting increased heterogeneity 
in care standards.  These costs are externalized onto providers—
mostly those serving other patients—who would find it more costly 
to obtain effective training, to coordinate care across providers, and 
 
147 See Hoangmai H. Pham et al., Care Patterns in Medicare and Their Implications for 
Pay for Performance, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1130, 1132-33 (2007) (noting that most Med-
icare beneficiaries are under the care of at least two primary care physicians and five 
specialists working in four different practices). 
148 It also is helpful for all providers to be ostensibly governed by a common stan-
dard of care because patients often are cared for by many providers, practicing out of 
many different institutions.  Standardizing the duty of care helps facilitate the coordi-
nation of care across these providers.  In turn, coordination would be more difficult if 
each different provider treating a patient were governed by a dramatically different 
standard of care.   
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to ascertain best medical practices.  Given these externalities, private 
contracting may well lead to more variation in the standard of care 
than patients would prefer.  Equivalently, private contracting could 
also lead to more variation than patients would select if they could 
act collectively (e.g., by imposing liability through the state) to de-
termine how much variation to permit.149 
Alternatively, if the network externalities and learning effects are 
strong enough, contracting could lead private parties to converge on 
standards that may be suboptimal.  As a result of network effects, large 
insurers and teaching hospitals will have disproportionate power to 
determine the level of care, because it is less costly for smaller provid-
ers to adhere to the level of care set by large insurers and teaching 
hospitals than to contract for their own standard of care, even if the 
other standard would be preferable.  The preferences of patients con-
tracting with these market makers thus would impose external costs on 
other patients.150  Moreover, the resulting uniformity would largely elim-
inate one of the principal asserted benefits of contractual liability:  its 
ability to allow for diversity in actual or effective standards of care.151 
Accordingly, analysis of the structure of the health care industry 
reveals that the most cherished benefit of contracting—the ability to 
individualize the standard of care—may not be a benefit at all if pa-
tients can only obtain it through a mechanism, such as individual con-
 
149 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 126, at 733 (“As long as the value of custo-
mized terms exceeds the value of the potential standard term to the initial user, [par-
ties] may customize even if standardization would be socially optimal.”). 
150 See, e.g., id. at 729-36 (describing the effects of learning and network externali-
ties on the efficiency of standard terms in contracts); Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 805-08 (1995) (arguing that 
standard terms adopted by heterogeneous firms may be inefficient because of network 
externalities); Kornhauser, supra note 126, at 1174-75, 1177-79 (stating that inefficient 
standard terms can occur even when there are no bargaining defects because of search 
costs, consumer irrationality, and bounded memory).  
151 Convergence on a uniform term would present a challenge for contractual lia-
bility because it would raise the question of why we need to achieve this uniformity 
through costly individual contracts instead of through the state.  After all, if patients 
are as informed about the costs and benefits of liability—and as attentive to this issue—
as contractual liability proponents assume them to be, it would seem that they should 
be sufficiently informed and attentive to induce legislatures to adopt optimal reforms.  
Many of the pathologies of interest-group politics (e.g., rent-seeking) arise because cit-
izens do not already know the costs and benefits of a legal rule and do not attend to 
the issue.  These problems with state action would be muted if citizens—and thus, pre-
sumably, the state—are perfectly informed about the effects of a legal rule, attend to the 
issue, and develop a uniform solution which in theory could even provide for the socially 
optimal level of variation across consumers.  See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE III 343-48 (2003) (discussing rent-seeking behavior and the political process).  
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tracting, that does not enable patients effectively to balance the bene-
fits of individualization against its costs.  This is a decision that, at least 
in theory, could be better made collectively. 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of contractual liability have long argued that states 
can best reform medical malpractice by allowing patients and medical 
providers to determine liability by contract.  They also insist that any 
reforms adopted should grant patients and medical providers the 
right to contract over liability.  Proponents’ faith in contract rests on 
the premise that informed patients cannot be hurt by the right to 
contract because they have optimal incentives to contract into liabili-
ty and thus can, and will, use contract to replicate the effects of even 
the best state-imposed liability.  This is not the case.  Informed pa-
tients who value liability cannot do as well for themselves through 
contract as they can when the state imposes effective liability by fiat 
because contractual liability—whether obtained individually or 
through MCOs—is a more restricted form of liability, conferring 
lower benefits at greater cost. 
Patients obtain less benefit from contractual liability because they 
cannot use it to obtain two primary benefits of state-imposed liability:  
the ability to induce medical providers to make additional cost-
effective investments in both collective and durable care, benefiting 
many patients, both now and in the future.  Malpractice liability is a 
potentially effective mechanism for regulating such investments be-
cause it is a collective, multiperiod, and multiprovider form of liability.  
Patients benefit from the ability to impose liability collectively because 
this effectively induces collective investments in care.  Patients benefit 
from the fact that tort liability spans multiple time periods because 
multiperiod liability can be used to induce providers to make durable 
investments to benefit future patients (precontractual care).  Patients 
could not use individual negotiable liability to induce equivalent in-
vestments in collective and precontractual care because such liability 
is too narrow in scope.  Beyond this, contractual liability would hurt 
patients who value liability because providers, recognizing the selection 
effects of liability, would charge patients more to impose liability by con-
tract than they would charge were liability mandatory.  Thus, rather than 
unambiguously benefiting patients, contractual liability would hurt those 
patients who value liability by reducing the benefit of imposing liability 
and increasing its cost.  As a result, contracting would pressure patients 
who benefited from state-imposed liability to waive liability by contract. 
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Accordingly, granting patients the right to contract with providers 
for liability cannot be assumed to make patients better off, because 
contractual liability does not unambiguously increase the choices 
available to patients.  Instead, adoption of contractual liability would 
preclude patients from imposing the form of liability that many value 
most—automatic, collectively imposed, multiperiod malpractice liabil-
ity—-and require them instead to consider a narrower, and less valua-
ble, form of liability.  This mandated change in the form of liability 
available to patients would hurt patients who value liability.  Accor-
dingly, states capable of reforming malpractice liability to benefit their 
citizens could best serve them by imposing reformed liability through 
the tort system and rejecting the call to permit contracting. 
